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POSTMODERN FREE EXPRESSION: A
PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALE FOR THE
DIGITAL AGE
STEPHEN

M. FELDMAN*

Three philosophical rationales-search-for-truth,self-governance, and
self-fulfillment-have animated discussions of free expression for decades.
Each rationaleemerged and attainedprominence in Americanjurisprudence
in specific political and cultural circumstances. Moreover, each rationale
shares a foundational commitment to the classical liberal (modernist) self
But the three traditionalrationalesare incompatiblewith our digitalage. In
particular, the idea of the classicalliberal self enjoying maximum liberty in
a private sphere does notfit in the postmodern information society. The time
for a new rationale has arrived. The same sociocultural conditions that
undermine the traditional rationales suggest a self-emergence rationale
built on the feminist concept of relational autonomy. This novel rationale
constitutionally protects expression that fosters the ongoing creative and
dynamic processofself-emergence. As such, the rationalejustifies protecting
expression concerned with the emergent self's struggle to define itself and
The self-emergence rationale has important
the broader culture.
free-expression issues related to the Internet
for
ramifications, especially
The Roberts Court has invoked the traditional rationales in granting
expansive first-amendment protections to corporations. Many Internetrelated issues involve multinational corporations,such as Google, Verizon,
and Facebook. But under the self-emergence rationale, publicly held
business corporationsshould not have free-speech rights for two reasons.
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First, they havefixed ratherthan emergent natures. Second, they manipulate
and limit the sociocultural space available for the autonomous selfemergence of individuals.
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INTRODUCTION

Three philosophical rationales animate discussions of free expression
in American constitutional jurisprudence.' The search-for-truth or
marketplace-of-ideas rationale maintains that the free exchange of ideas is
the best means for society to identify truth and falsity. The self-governance
rationale maintains that the free discussion of political issues is a
prerequisite for democracy. The self-fulfillment rationale maintains that
free expression is necessary for each individual to realize his or her
potential and ambitions. Scholars occasionally have suggested alternative
rationales, but these three have ruled the free-expression roost for

1. See THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7
SYSTEM] (summarizing philosophical rationales).

(1970) [hereinafter
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decades. 2
The time for change has arrived. Each of the three primary rationales
first attained prominence in American jurisprudence in specific historical
and political settings.3 All three rely on the foundation of the classicalliberal self: a self that exists prior to society and culture; is its own
sovereign center of power; and enjoys maximum liberty so long as
government is absent. 4 Life in our information society, however, casts the
self into a different light. The self in the digital age is an emergent self.5 It
emerges through an ongoing creative and dynamic process always situated
within a sociocultural context.6
An understanding of the emergent self reveals the shortcomings of the
traditional philosophical rationales. Without the classical liberal self,
The emergent self necessitates a new
those rationales collapse.
philosophical rationale that can elucidate free expression in the
information society. I call this novel justification for free expression the
self-emergence rationale.
The self-emergence rationale has important implications for numerous
free-speech issues, particularly those involving digital technologies. For
instance, on November 10, 2014, President Barack Obama recommended
that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) impose net
neutrality-also referred to as an Open Internet-which would require
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to provide all customers with equal
service.7 Net neutrality would prevent ISPs, including multinational
corporations (MNCs) such as Verizon, Comcast, and AT&T, from charging
customers extra for faster service.8 On February 4, 2015, the chair of the

2. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986) (arguing that the underlying
purpose of the First Amendment is to promote tolerance); MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.04 (1984) (arguing that free expression provides a "safety valve" for
society).
3. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008)
(providing a comprehensive history of free expression).
4. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN & REIN RAUD, PRACTICES OF SELFHOOD 1-3 (2015); PHILIP CUSHMAN,
CONSTRUCTING THE SELF, CONSTRUCTING AMERICA 30-33 (1995); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE

SELF 143-98 (1989).
S. See infra Part Ill. For an excellent introduction to digital technology and the Internet, see
JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS 1-41 (4th ed. 2014).

6. KENNETH J. GERGEN, RELATIONAL BEING xv (2009) (emphasizing the ongoing process of
relationships).
7. Edward Wyatt, Obama Urges FCC to Adopt StrictRules on Net Neutrality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2014.
8. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH 260, 286-87 (2011 ed.) (discussing net neutrality).
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FCC, Tom Wheeler, proposed new rules that would implement net
neutrality.9 On February 26, 2015, the FCC adopted the rules, which went
into effect on June 12, 2015.10 As expected, ISPs and trade organizations
representing the wireless and cable industries sued on multiple grounds."
The industry has repeatedly challenged FCC regulations, including net
neutrality, and one persistent issue has been whether the regulations
violate the ISPs' first-amendment rights to free expression.1 2 They claim a
right to transfer or not transfer any information they desire and at any
speed they desire.' 3 Moreover, numerous other digital-related issues are
percolating in the lower courts and might soon reach the Supreme Court.' 4
Many of these issues involve MNCs, including Google, Verizon, and
Facebook.' 5 Most important, then, the Roberts Court has invoked the
traditional rationales in granting expansive first-amendment protections
to corporations. If the Court continues to uphold broad corporate freespeech rights in the context of digital-related cases, the expressive liberties
of ordinary Americans will be severely diminished. Thus, one goal of this
Article is to redeem individual autonomy, especially as related to free
expression, in a world where MNCs control digital architecture,
manipulate computer users for profit, and share surveillance data with
9. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FACT SHEET: CHAIRMAN WHEELER PROPOSES NEW

RULES FOR PROTECTING THE OPEN INTERNET (Feb. 4, 2015); Tom Wheeler, This Is How We Will
Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4,2015).
10. Federal
Communications
Commission,
Open
Internet,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet [https://perma.cc/4PJ2-NNYZ].
11. E.g., State of Tennessee v. FCC, No. 15-3921/15-3555 (6th Cir. May 21, 2015); U.S.
Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 23, 2015). In the latter case, the D.C. Circuit of
Appeals relied on statutory interpretation and administrative law to hold that the Federal
Communications Commission can define high-speed Internet service as a utility, which creates
the possibility for broad regulation. U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

12. Jon Brodkin, How Net Neutrality Violates the FirstAmendment (According to One ISP),
ARSTECHNICA (Oct. 6, 2015) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/net-neutralityviolates-the-first-amendment-according-to-one-isp/
[https://perma.cc/Z3QD-7P6R];
Karl
Bode, AT&T Argues Net Neutrality Violates Its First Amendment Rights, BROADBAND (May 26,
2015) https://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20150526/06475031101/attargues-net-neutrality-violates-first-amendment-rights.shtml [https://perma.cc/8VQK-BSPV].
13. In Verizon v. FCC, Verizon argued that any FCC regulation of its activities amounted to a
first-amendment violation. The court held that the FCC's imposition of net neutrality was, in
effect, contrary to a previous FCC ruling, which the agency had not changed. 740 F.3d 623, 634
(D.C. Cir. 2014); see Susan Crawford, FirstAmendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2343,
2347-91 (2014) (discussing Verizon case).
14. E.g., Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 372-86 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that clicking "like"
on a candidate's Facebook page constituted speech).
15. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Song fi, Inc. v. Google Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d
53, 56 (D.D.C. 2014); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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governments.1 6 A repudiation of the traditional philosophical rationales
and an acceptance of the self-emergence rationale would enhance
individual autonomy and change the likely results in many of these
upcoming digital-technology cases.1 7
This Article opposes two conceptions of the self: the classical liberal
and the emergent. The classical liberal self is a modernist self,18
philosophically rooted in Descartes's separation of a thinking self from the
external world: "I think, [therefore] I am."' 9 It is manifested in John Locke's
focus on the self's unified experience of sense impressions.2 0 In Locke's
political philosophy, this unified self begins in a state of nature. It joins
civil society and consents to government to protect its preexisting rights
and liberties. Consequently, Lockean theory suggests that the limitation or
absence of government maximizes individual liberty. 21 Mainstream
(modernist) psychology similarly views "the self as individuated and
autonomous, that is, as having core properties that are universal, bounded,
atomic and detached from its cultural social and historical moorings." 22
The self therefore can attain a "progressively truer understanding" of itself,
regardless of politics and culture. 23 From this perspective, characteristics
16. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 15-103 (2015) (explaining how corporations
and governments use digitally-gathered data to control and manipulate individuals).
17. Anupam Chander & Uy~n P. L6, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 506-07 (2015)
(emphasizing that digital technology makes this era especially important for free speech).
18. Some theorists would also refer to this self as the Enlightenment self because of its roots
in Enlightenment philosophy. See supra note 4. For a discussion of modernity in philosophy and
jurisprudence, see STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 15-28, 83-136 (2000) [hereinafter FELDMAN, VOYAGE].
19. Rend Descartes, Meditations, in THE RATIONALISTS 63, 97, 112-27 (John Veitch trans.,
Anchor Books 1974) (1641) (including Descartes's cogito). The modernist self also has roots in
Christian theology and culture. LARRY SIEDENTOP, INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF
WESTERN LIBERALISM (2014). One can read Kant as attempting to structure modernist philosophy
and the modernist self to harmonize with Protestant theology. ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN
M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 207-10 (1996).
20. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1690), reprinted in THE
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 238 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939).
21. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 4-11 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
1952) (emphasizing individual freedom in state of nature). As Michael Sandel characterizes the
classical liberal self, "we are free and independent selves, capable of choosing our own ends."
Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (1994) (reviewing JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).

22. Sunil Bhatia & Henderikus J. Stam, Critical Engagements with Culture and Self, 15
THEORY& PSYCHOLOGY 419, 420 (2005).

23. Jack Martin & Jeff Sugarman, Between the Modern and the Postmodern: The Possibility of
Self and Progressive Understanding in Psychology, 55 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 397, 397 (2000);
Bhatia & Stam, supra note 22, at 420.
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such as gender, race, and ethnicity are epiphenomenal to the true self 2 4
If the classical liberal self is a modernist self, then the emergent selfthe primary subject of this Article-is a postmodern self.2 5 To be clear,
postmodernism is not merely about theory. 26 Social, cultural, and material
changes have ushered in postmodernity. 27 Digital and online technology,
in particular, have vividly changed our experience of our world and
ourselves.28 Postmodern theory tries to make sense of these changes. 29
Postmodern theory, though, has had a problem with individual
autonomy;3 0 postmodernists typically assert that sociocultural forces
constitute the self,3 1 but if the self is socially constructed, then how can it

be free? Sociocultural forces would seem to determine the self at every
turn.32 This postmodern autonomy problem is especially pronounced in
constitutional law. In a Constitution that articulates and protects
individual rights and freedoms, how can we accept postmodern theory if it
undermines autonomy? More specifically, what is free speech without
autonomy?

24. Julie Cohen summarizes the classical liberal self as being "autonomous, fully
individuated, and essentially immaterial." JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 132
(2012) [hereinafter COHEN, CONFIGURING]; see Richard Harvey Brown, Narration and Postmodern
MediationsofWestern Selflhood, in THE POLITICS OF SELFHOOD 189, 189 (Richard Harvey Brown ed.,
2003) (explaining modernist self). Cohen elaborates her ideas in Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is
For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013) [hereinafter Cohen, Privacy].
25. By subject, I mean both the topic (of this Article) and the self being described (in this
Article).
26. See Dennis Patterson, Introduction,in POSTMODERNISM AND LAW xi (Dennis Patterson ed.,
1994).
27. STEVEN BEST & DOUGLAS KELLNER, THE POSTMODERN ADVENTURE 7-11 (2001); see FREDRIC
JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM 62 (1991) (describing

postmodernism as cultural).
28. Sherry argues that postmodernism did not make sense to her until she became
immersed in computer and online technology. SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN
THEAGE OF THE INTERNET 15-18 (1995).

29. For contrasts between modern and postmodern theory, from a philosophical
standpoint, see NANCEY MURPHY, ANGLO-AMERICAN POSTMODERNITY 1 (1997); Patterson, supra note
26, at xi, xii-xiv. For a description of eight overlapping postmodern themes, see FELDMAN,
VOYAGE, supra note 18, at 37-45, 137-87.
30. See Michel Foucault, Afterword: The Subject and Power, in HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL
RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTIcs 208, 211-12 (2d ed.

1983).
31. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND

HERMENEUTICS 120 (2d ed. 1983); Foucault, supra note 30, at 211-12; David Couzens Hoy,
Introduction to FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL READER 1, 4-5 (David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986).
32. See SOLOMON & HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 303 (explaining the critique of postmodernism
as undermining freedom).
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Significantly, feminist theorists reject the conclusion that social
construction necessarily ends in determinism. Building on seminal
research in psychology, conducted by Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan,
feminist theorists have articulated the concept of a relational self: a self
that arises, develops, and exists in and through relationships with others.33
Although the terminology differs, this feminist relational self equates with
the postmodern socially constructed self.3 4 Either way, the self is
fundamentally a social creature.35 Yet, feminist theory is ultimately
political, seeking social transformations that will relieve women from
patriarchal oppression and subjugation. 36 If the relational (socially
constructed) self were determined, then women would seemingly lack the
autonomy to advocate for and create such political change.37 Thus,
feminist theorists extended the concept of a relational self to a concept of
relational autonomy. They developed a notion of autonomy based not on
isolation, independence, and self-reliance, but rather on the existence and
cultivation of nurturing and empowering relationships. 3 8 This Article
builds on the feminist concept of relational autonomy to articulate the self-

33. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (2d ed. 1999); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A

DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); see Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the PatriarchalUnconscious:A
Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in DISCOVERING REALITY 245, 250
(Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983) (developing concept of relational self). For a
collection of essays on the relational self, see FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF (Diana Tietjens Meyers

ed., 1997).
34. See Seyla Benhabib, Subjectivity, Historiography, and Politics: Reflections on the
'Feminism/PostmodernismExchange,' in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS 107, 108 (1995).

35. Martha Chamallas, Pastas Prologue:Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER &L. 157,
169-70 (2010) (recognizing the emergence of an explicitly postmodern feminism); Nancy J.
Hirschmann, Autonomy? Or Freedom? A Return to Psychoanalytic Theory, in AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 61, 73 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) ("our desires and

preferences are socially constructed"); see Amy Allen, Foucault, Feminism, and the Self The
&

Politics of Personal Transformation, in FEMINISM AND THE FINAL FOUCAULT 235 (Dianna Taylor

Karen Vintges eds., 2004) (discussing the connection between Foucault and the feminist
relational self); Margaret A. McLaren, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Resistance, Freedom, in
FEMINISM AND THE FINAL FOUCAULT 214, 215-19 (Dianna Taylor & Karen Vintges eds., 2004)

(linking feminism with Foucauldian postmodernism).
36. See Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 3, 3-4 (Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stolijar eds., 2000) (emphasizing

the need to understand oppression and subjection).
37. For this reason, some feminists initially rejected postmodernism.

ELIZABETH Fox-

GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 153-59, 220-21 (1991).

38. Helpful books developing the concept of relational autonomy include the following:
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW'S RELATIONS (2011); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS
(2003); PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Marina A.L.

Oshana ed., 2015); AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds.,
2014); RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 36.
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emergence rationale for free expression.
Part II explains the historical emergence of the three primary
philosophical rationales while emphasizing their shared foundational
commitments to the classical liberal self. Part III demonstrates that
circumstances in our digital age render the concept of the classical liberal
self incongruous.
The structures and culture of the postmodern
information society reveal that the self is socially constructed-each
individual self forms and exists in a network of social relations-and that
the traditional separation of society into preexisting public and private
spheres is no longer coherent. If the idea of the classical liberal self
enjoying maximum liberty in a private sphere is undermined, then the
traditional rationales collapse. Part IV draws on feminist theory to
elaborate the self-emergence rationale and its implications. The same
digital-age sociocultural conditions that undermine the primary rationales
lead to the concept of relational autonomy and the self-emergence
rationale. This new rationale constitutionally protects expression that
fosters the ongoing creative and dynamic process of self-emergence. As
such, the rationale justifies protecting expression concerned with the
emergent self s struggle to define either itself or the broader culture and
society in which the self emerges. The second section in Part IV focuses on
free-expression rights vis-A-vis the use and control of the Internet and
digital information. Because MNCs play a prominent role in designing and
managing Internet architecture, I emphasize the first-amendment rights of
business corporations, particularly publicly held corporations. In short,
such business corporations should not enjoy free-expression rights
because they neither protect nor facilitate self-emergence. Part V, the
conclusion of the Article, compares the self-emergence rationale to an
alternative rationale for the digital age proposed by Jack Balkin.3 9 A crucial
advantage of the self-emergence rationale is that it builds on feminist
theory to articulate and emphasize a postmodern type of individual
autonomy and thus avoids dwelling on an antihumanist determinism.
Two caveats are in order at the outset. First, the Roberts Court has
proven to be remarkably receptive to corporate legal claims, whether

39. Balkin's rationale emphasizes democratic culture. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free
Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009) [hereinafter Balkin, Future]; Jack M.
Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital]. Balkin's more recent
article on free expression in the digital age does not focus on this democratic-culture rationale.
Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014)
[hereinafter Balkin, Regulation].
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under the First Amendment or otherwise. 40 Empirical studies show that
the Roberts Court, until Justice Scalia's death, was the most pro-business
Supreme Court since World War II.41 Including Scalia, five of the justices
ranked among the top ten justices most favorable to business during that
time; Alito and Roberts are first and second on the list.42 Obviously, the
nomination and confirmation of a new justice to fill Scalia's open seat
might swing the political balance of the Court and affect the Court's
receptivity to corporate legal claims, though just as obviously, strongly
pro-business justices will continue to sit on the Court for the foreseeable
future.
Second, a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional framing and
the adoption of the First Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article.
But some scholars, it should be acknowledged, would argue that the
framers constitutionalized the classical liberal self as central to our
government system. 43 Richard Epstein recently declared: "In its enduring
provisions, our Constitution is most emphatically a classical liberal
document." 44 Consequently, Epstein, who claims to follow a "guarded"
originalism, 45 depicts our constitutional government as no more than "a
necessary evil." 4 6 But Epstein's view of the framing is historically
inaccurate. The framers did not fully adopt classical liberalism (or the
classical liberal self). 4 7 Rather, they attempted to straddle the divide
between civic republicanism and liberalism. They drew as much from
republican writers, such as John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, the

&

40. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (holding that Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure protected corporation from class-action claim); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (holding thata discrimination claim against Goodyear was time-

barred).
41. Lee Epstein et al., How Business Faresin the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013)
(quantitative study of all postwar business-related cases); see Corey Ciocchetti, The Constitution,
the Roberts Court, and Business, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 385 (2013) (emphasizing how strongly

the Roberts Court supported business in the 2011-2012 term).
42. Epstein, supra note 41, at 1449-51, 1472-73.
43. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION (2014).

44. Id. at 53. "[T]he United States Constitution . . can best be explained in light of classical
liberal theory." Id at ix.
45. Id. at 45. Thus, Epstein refers to "the original classical liberal constitutional order." Id.
at 6.
46. Id. at 6.
47. Stephen M. Feldman, Is the Constitution Laissez Faire?: The Framers,Original Meaning,
and the Market, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2015) (exploring the framers' attitudes toward the
government and the economic marketplace).
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authors of Cato's Letters, as from John Locke and Adam Smith.48 The
framers, one can reasonably conclude, attempted to achieve a balance
between republican and liberal outlooks. 49
II. THE HISTORY OF THE THREE PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALES

The history of the three philosophical rationales-search-for-truth,
self-governance, and self-fulfillment-demonstrates two important
points. First, each rationale emerged and attained prominence in
American constitutional jurisprudence in specific political and cultural
circumstances.5 0 In other words, for each of the respective rationales, its
influence is historically contingent. Second, all three rationales share a
foundational commitment to the classical liberal self.5
A.

The Search-for-Truth Rationale

The Supreme Court did not explicitly decide a free-expression case
under the First Amendment until the World-War-I era. 52 Before that point,
free-expression doctrine had developed in the lower courts, which treated
free expression similarly to other individual rights under republican
democracy, the predominant view of American government from the
founding through the 1920s.s 3

Individual rights and liberties were

protected from undue government interference but were always
subordinate to the government's power to act for the common good.5 4 In

48. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE (David

L. Jacobson ed., 1994 ed.) (writings of Trenchard and Gordon); see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969) (emphasizing the civic republican nature of the
framing).
49. "Madison's political thought was characterized by an often agonized effort to find a
working balance between the rights of property and republican principles." JENNIFER NEDELSKY,
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 (1990); see Stephen M.

Feldman, The Interpretationof ConstitutionalHistory, or Charles Beard Becomes a Fortuneteller
(With an Emphasis on FreeExpression), 29 CONST. COMMENTARY 323 (2014) (arguing that framers
aimed for balance between public and private spheres). Neither the framers nor the first
Congress, which drafted the First Amendment, commented much about the substantive
meanings of free speech or a free press. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 60-69.
50. Infra I.A, B, C.
51. Infra Ill.A, B, C.
52. The Supreme Court had previously decided a handful of due process cases that involved
issues related to free expression. E.g., Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (upholding flag
desecration statute).
53. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 101-290.

54. James Kent explained that "private interest must be made subservient to the general
interest of the community." JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (New York, 0.
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other words, the republican democratic principles of the common good
and civic virtue informed the legal doctrine of free expression and
engendered limited judicial protections for speech and writing. Courts
prohibited prior restraints but allowed governments to punish speech or
writing that was likely to produce bad tendencies or harmful
consequences because such expression undermined virtue and
contravened the common good.5 5
The Supreme Court's first free-expression decisions arose from World
War I Espionage Act prosecutions. In Schenck v. United States, the general
secretary of the Socialist party and an Executive Board member were
convicted for printing several thousand copies of a leaflet and mailing it to
draft-eligible men.5 6 The leaflet advocated for the repeal of the draft law
and argued that conscription violated the Thirteenth Amendment's
proscription of slavery.57 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote an
opinion for a unanimous Court upholding the convictions.5 8 In response to
the defendants' argument that the First Amendment protected their
expression, Holmes articulated a doctrinal test: "The question in every case
is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
59 While
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
Holmes's clear and present danger terminology was novel (and apparently
derived from his book, The Common Law), his application of the test
demonstrated that he did not intend to articulate a new standard for
delineating the scope of free expression. 60 For Holmes, clear and present

Halsted 1827).
55. Knowles v. United States, 170 F. 409 (8th Cir. 1909); Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417
(1877); Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461 (N.Y. Sup. 1860); Updegraph v. commonwealth, 11 Serg.
& Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. 176 (1811). Courts sometimes stated
that a criminal defendant must also have intended harmful consequences. Under the doctrine of
constructive intent, however, the courts typically reasoned that a defendant was presumed to
have intended the natural and probable consequences of his or her statements. If a defendant's
expression was found to have bad tendencies, then the defendant's criminal intent would be
inferred. Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts Prior to
Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 14 (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds.,
1982).
56. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
57. Id at 50-51.
58. Id. at 53.
59. Id. at 52.
60. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 66-68 (1881, Dover 1991); see G. Edward
White,justice Holmes and the ModernizationofFree Speech jurisprudence:The Human Dimension,
80 CAL. L. REV. 391, 414-19 (1992) (discussing Holmes's understanding of criminal attempts and
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danger meant bad tendency. The First Amendment proscribed prior
restraints but otherwise allowed the government to punish any speech or
writing that would contravene the common good. 61
One week later, the Court unanimously upheld convictions in two more
Espionage Act cases: Frohwerkv. United States, and Debs v. United States.62
Writing the Court's opinions in both cases, Holmes followed bad tendency
doctrinal principles while disregarding his clear and present danger
terminology. 63 This first set of World War I cases revealed that all of the
justices, including Holmes, considered free expression to be an individual
liberty like any other under republican democracy, subordinate to
government actions furthering the common good. The government could
punish any speech or writing that impeded the national war effort because
such expression would be deemed harmful or with bad tendencies.
The Court would not decide its next Espionage Act case, Abrams v.
United States, for another eight months. 64 Before that time, a young
Harvard professor, Zechariah Chafee, published an article that apparently
shaped Holmes's surprising dissent in Abrams. 65 Chafee was part of a
burgeoning civil libertarian movement that had emerged precisely
because of the government's continuing efforts at suppression even after
the war's end. 6 6 As a civil libertarian, Chafee sought to demonstrate that
the Court should interpret the First-Amendment protection of free
expression expansively. 67 More specifically, he wanted to show that
criticisms of the war and draft were protected speech. 68 Consequently, he
rejected the bad tendency test because it allowed the government far too
much power to punish expression. 69 A crucial problem for Chafee was that
how it shaped his clear and present danger test). But see David M. Rabban, The Emergence of
Modern FirstAmendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1271-78 (1983) (arguing that this
connection was probable but not definite).
61. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 260.
62. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).

63. For instance, Debs upheld a jury instruction that presented the bad tendency test in
conventional terms. 249 U.S. at 216.
64. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
65. See Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919)
[hereinafter Chafee, War Time]. Chafee built this article on an earlier essay. Zechariah Chafee,

Jr., Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 1918, at 66.
66. E.g., Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom ofSpeech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, at
13; see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 75-121 (1991) (discussing civil libertarian
movement).
67. Chafee, War Time, supra note 65, at 967-72.
68. Id. at 960.
69. Id. at 953.
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the right to free speech under the First Amendment was an individual
right.70 In wartime, most judges, politicians, and commentators had
assumed that the national or social interest in security, in pressing for
victory, necessarily outweighed any individual right.71 How could the right
of a single individual-a classical liberal self-outweigh the needs of all of
American society?
Chafee's solution was the search-for-truth rationale, first articulated by
John Milton during the English Civil War, then reiterated by John Stuart
Mill in the nineteenth century. 72 "Let [truth] and falsehood grapple,"
Milton had written, "[and] who ever knew truth put to the worse, in a free
and open encounter?"73 Chafee linked a social interest in the search for
truth with the individual speaker's interest in or right to free expression.
"The true meaning of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most
important purposes of society and government is the discovery and spread
of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible only through
absolutely unlimited discussion...

."74

Chafee did not argue, though, that

this social interest rendered free expression an absolute right To the
contrary, freedom of speech often must be balanced against other
government purposes and interests. 75 In the context of wartime and the
Espionage Act,
[t]he true boundary line of the First Amendment can be
fixed only when Congress and the courts realize that the
principle on which speech is classified as lawful or
unlawful involves the balancing against each other of two
very important social interests, in public safety and in the
search for truth. 76
But, as Chafee underscored, one must be careful not to underestimate the

70. Id at 957.

71. Id. at 959.
72. Id. at 960.
73. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO THE
PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), http://www.constitution.org/milton/areopagitica.htm
[https://perma.cc/VLW3-F9YN]. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21-27 (Liberal Arts Press 1956)
(1859). Chafee cited both Milton and Mill. Chafee, War Time, supra note 65, at 932-33 n.1, 954-

55.
74. Chafee, War Time, supra note 65, at 956.
75. Id. at 956-57.
76. Id. at 959-60.
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social value of free expression in the search for truth. "[F]reedom of speech
ought to weigh very heavily in the scale. The First Amendment gives
binding force to this principle of political wisdom."7 7
Chafee continued by linking the search for truth with Holmes's clear
and present danger language from Schenck.78 But while Holmes had
applied his clear and present danger test as if it were no different from the
bad tendency test, Chafee now imbued it with significant bite. In Chafee's
hands, the clear and present danger test became highly protective of
expression. Thus, consistent with the civil liberties movement, Chafee
bolstered the protection of the individual right to free expression by
connecting it to a broad societal interest in the search for truth.79 The
individual-each individuated liberal self-acted for the greater good of
society by contributing his or her ideas to the search for truth.8 0 In this
vein, the clear and present danger test could become a doctrinal standard
that would provide a suitable level of constitutional protection for speech
and writing.8 1
Holmes would never acknowledge that Chafee had influenced his
conception of free expression, but his dissenting opinion in Abrams would
follow Chafee's argument as if it had been a roadmap. 82 The defendants in
Abrams had been convicted for printing and distributing leaflets that
criticized President Wilson's leadership during the war.8 3 Affirming the
convictions, the Court brushed aside the defendants' first-amendment
arguments by reasoning that Schenck and Frohwerkcontrolled. 84 Holmes
and Justice Louis Brandeis dissented, with Brandeis joining Holmes's
opinion. Holmes asserted the correctness of the Court's previous decisions
in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, and then reiterated his clear and present
danger phrasing from Schenck. Now, though, Holmes imbued this phrase
with new vigor; it no longer equated with the bad tendency test. He
justified this invigorated clear and present danger test by emphasizing the

77. Id. at 957.
78. Id. at 960, 967.
79. Id. at 959-60.
80. See Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality(Part1l), 28 HARV. L. REv. 445, 453 (1915).
81. Chafee was following the methods of his mentor, Roscoe Pound, who was a leader of
the sociological jurisprudence movement FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 271-72; see, e.g., Pound,
supra note 80, at 454-56 (linking individual interests with societal interests).
82. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 272-81 (explaining Holmes's changed attitude toward
free expression).
83. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617-20 (1919).
84. Id. at 618-19.
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societal search for truth:8 5
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct
that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.8 6
Holmes explicitly linked the search-for-truth rationale with the clear and
present danger test.87 "[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts

to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death," he explained, "unless they so imminently threaten immediate
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country."88 The government, that
is, should allow speech and writing to flow into a marketplace of ideas.
From this free exchange of ideas, the truth will emerge. Harmful ideas
must be met with better ideas-counterspeech-rather than with force or
suppression. The only ideas (speech and writing) that should be restricted
are those that would inhibit the further exchange of ideas-namely, those
that would engender a clear and present (or imminent) danger of unlawful
or harmful conduct.89
Holmes analogy between the search for truth and the economic
marketplace underscored that his (and Chafee's) free-expression
approach rested on the classical liberal self. Each individual needs to do
no more than contribute his or her ideas to the marketplace. The invisible
hand of the marketplace will then naturally lead society to truth. The
constitutional protection of the individual self will ultimately benefit
society. Eventually vindicating Holmes's view, other justices have
persistently reiterated the search-for-truth theory. In Chaplinsky v. New

85. Id. at 627-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 630.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Holmes did not use the precise phrase, "marketplace of ideas." See Vincent Blasi,
Holmes and the Marketplace ofldeas, 2004 SUP. CT. REv. 1, 13 & n.41, 24 & n.80 (on the first uses
of this phrase, more than fifteen years after Holmes's Abrams dissent).
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Hampshire, the Court concluded that certain types of speech, particularly
so-called fighting words-"those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"-do not deserve
constitutional protection. 90 "[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas," the Court reasoned, and thus do not contribute to the
discovery of "truth."91 In Red Lion Broadcastingv. FCC, a unanimous Court
wrote that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." 92
The Court used the marketplace of ideas as recently as 2010.93

B.

The Self-Governance Rationale

Through the 1920s, the Court continued to interpret the First
Amendment narrowly, in accord with republican democratic principles.
Holmes and Brandeis often dissented while relying on the clear and
present danger test, as distinct from the bad tendency test.94 During World
War I and a subsequent Red Scare period (1919-1920), numerous states
had passed criminal syndicalism statutes-laws that prohibited violence
or advocacy of violence as a means of accomplishing political change-and
challenges to convictions under these laws began to reach the Court in
mid-decade.95 The Court upheld one such conviction in Whitney v.
California.96 California had convicted Charlotte Whitney, a member of the
Communist Labor Party, for organizing and belonging to an organization
advocating criminal syndicalism, even though Whitney personally sought
peaceful political change.97 Brandeis, joined by Holmes, wrote a separate
opinion that functioned as a dissent though it technically concurred in the
judgment (because Whitney had not adequately raised the free-expression
issues).9 8 Brandeis acknowledged that the parameters of the clear and
present danger test remained obscure,9 9 so he articulated three
philosophical rationales to elucidate the test and its protection of speech

90. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
91. Id.
92. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
93. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010).
94. For one such case, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
95. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 369 (1927) (lists cases where similar Criminal
Syndicalism statutes in other states have been challenged).
96. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
97. Id. at 359-66.
98. Id. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment).
99. Id. at 374.
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and writing-philosophical justifications that theorists would develop
over the next decades into the primary rationales for an expansive
interpretation of the First Amendment.10 0 First, Brandeis reiterated the
that
emphasizing
rationale,
or marketplace
search-for-truth
counterspeech "affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine." 101 Second, Brandeis linked free
expression to democratic government, though he did not argue that
freedom to express one's opinion on political issues is prerequisite to full
Rather, consistent with republican
democratic participation.1 02
discussion is a political duty" and
public
"that
he
maintained
democracy,
that free discussion of "supposed grievances and proposed remedies"
nurtures stable government.10 3 Through public discussion of political
issues, Brandeis implied, the virtuous citizenry discerns the common good
and discourages government corruption. Third, Brandeis alluded to the
inherent importance of individual liberty: The founders "valued liberty
both as an end and as a means." 0 4 Free expression not only was a means
to truth or free government; it was valuable in and of itself. 0 5
In 1931, when the Court decided its first two cases validating freeexpression claims, the justices still conceptualized free expression within
the structures of republican democracy.1 06 Yet, by the late-1920s and
early- to mid-1930s, republican democracy was crumbling, and the
100. Thomas 1. Emerson, Toward a GeneralTheory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
878 (1963) [hereinafter Toward]; Rabban, supra note 60, at 1346-47; G. Edward White, The First
Amendment Comes ofAge: The Emergence of FreeSpeech In Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 299, 300-02 (1996).
101. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment).
102. Id. at 375-76.
103. Id. at 375.
104. Id.
105. Brandeis used these three philosophical rationales, particularly the search-for-truth
and democratic-governance rationales, to explain the clear and present danger test. "[N]o
danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion,"
Brandeis wrote. Id. at 377. "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence." Id. The only expression that should be punished is that which would likely
engender an imminent (or "present") danger of unlawful or harmful conduct and would
therefore preclude any further discussion or exchange of ideas. Meanwhile, for expression to
constitute a "clear" danger, Brandeis explained that it must generate a probability of "serious
evil" or injury. Id. at 376. Because free expression is so significant to republican democratic
government, punishment "would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial
harm to society." Id. at 377.
106. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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practices of pluralist democracy were crystallizing under the pressures of
industrialization, immigration, and urbanization. 107 "In the republican
system, an alleged lack of civic virtue could preclude one from
participating in democratic processes."1 08 On this ground, the exclusion of
women, African Americans, Irish-Catholic immigrants, and other
peripheral groups had supposedly been justified during long stretches of
American history.10 9 But by the 1930s, mainstream and old-stock
Protestant values, which had long been manifested in conceptions of virtue
and the common good, were being balanced with the values of other
Americans who constituted the demographically diverse population.1 10
Thus, the key to pluralist democracy lay not in the specification of
supposedly objective goals, such as the common good, but rather in the
following of processes that allowed all citizens to voice their particular
values and interests within a free and open democratic arena.11 1 Under
pluralist democracy (first manifested politically in the New Deal), no single
set of values or interests is inherently predominant. 112 Each individual
citizen-each individuated self-supposedly has an equal right to express
his or her respective interests and values. 113
During the post-World War II years, Robert A. Dahl comprehensively
articulated pluralist democratic theory. 114
Because pluralist (or
polyarchal) democracy accepted the inevitable pursuit of self-interestrather than the pursuit of an objective substantive goal (the common
good)-pluralist democracy required the institutionalization of a
"process" that would allow the people to determine which interests would
be at least temporarily enshrined as communal goals. 115 A communal goal

107. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 166-97.
108. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 638-39 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds.,
2015).
109. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 209 (1997) (quoting Samuel Morse criticizing Irish
Catholics).
110. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 314-16.
111. JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 176 (1939).

112. FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 316-19.
113. WILFRED E. BINKLEY & MALCOLM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS 113 (1949);
V. 0. KEY, JR., POLITICS PARTIES AND PRESSURE GROUPS (1942).
114. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY]; ROBERT A.
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) [hereinafter PREFACE]; see IRA KATZNELSON,

DESOLATION AND ENLIGHTENMENT 107-76 (2003) (arguing that Dahl and several other post-World
War 11 scholars sought to articulate an approach to politics and democracy that made sense in
the shadow of recent world tragedies).
115. DEMOCRACY, supra note 114, at 83, 106; PREFACE, supra note 114, at 67-71.
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was legitimate only if the conditions for democracy were satisfied-if the
proper process were followed. Thus, Dahl identified the conditions, such
as the identical weighing of each individual vote, which were requisite to
the operation of a democratic process.11 6 The most important component
of the democratic process, according to Dahl, is "effective participation":
Citizens must have "adequate" and "equal" opportunities "for expressing
their preferences ... for placing

questions

on the agenda and for

expressing reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another."1 7 If
these free-expression rights are absent, Dahl insisted, then "the democratic
process does not exist."11 8 The pluralist democratic process provided a
means for each individual citizen to contribute his or her interests and
values to the institutionalized identification of the community's political
goals.
Dahl was neither the first nor the last political (or constitutional)
theorist to accentuate the importance of free expression within the
pluralist democratic regime." 9 Pursuant to the self-governance rationale,
no liberty or right-not even voting-is more crucial to the pluralist
democratic process than free expression. Free speech and writing allow
diverse groups and individuals to contribute their views in the pluralist
political arena. If government officials interfere with the pluralist process,
if they dictate or control public debates, then they skew the democratic
outcomes and undermine the consent of the governed. As Alexander
Meiklejohn emphasized, the need to protect political expression "springs
from the necessities of the program of self-government."1 20
Under pluralist democracy, free expression became a constitutional
"lodestar."121 In a stark about-face from the Court's consistent repudiation
of free-speech rights during the republican democratic era, the justices
upheld numerous first-amendment claims.1 22 For example, in Thornhill v.
Alabama, the Court emphasized that government cannot be allowed to
116. PREFACE, supra note 114, at 67; see DEMOCRACY, supra note 114, at 109-11 (discussing
voting equality).
117. DEMOCRACY, supra note 114, at 109.
118. Id. at 170; see id. at 169-75 (discussing free speech and other rights integral to the
democratic process).
119. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96 (1940); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 208.
120. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948).

121. White, supra note 100, at 300-01.
122. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding that labor picketing is protected
free speech); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidiating conviction for distributing
handbills); Hague v. C.i.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (upholding right of unions to organize in streets).
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"diminish the effective exercise of rights so necessary to the maintenance
of democratic institutions."123 In West Virginia State Board of Ed. v.
Barnette, Justice Robert Jackson reasoned for the Court: "We set up
government by consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those
in power any legal opportunity to coerce that consent. Authority here is to
be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by authority."1 24
Jackson elaborated in strong ringing language: "If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."1 25 The self-governance rationale was invoked as recently as
2014.126

C

The Self-Fulfillment Rationale

An individualist ethos has always permeated American culture.1 27 In
1800, Tunis Wortman, a lawyer and political theorist, proclaimed that
"[a]ll our prospects of improvement... depend upon the industry and
exertion of individuals. It is almost impossible to conceive the extensive
effects which may be produced by the agency of a single person."1 28 In fact,
in the 1830s, Tocqueville first coined the term, individualism, and linked it
to the American conception of government.1 29 In the first-half of the
nineteenth century, a distinctly American literature emerged, emphasizing
individual independence, self-improvement, and an iconoclastic wariness
toward authority.13 o Even so, during the late-nineteenth and early-

123. 310 U.S. at 96.
124. 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
125. Id. at 642.
126. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 756
(2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
127. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 263-64

(1995) (emphasizing connection between American individualism and democracy).
128. TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF THE

PRESS 128 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1800).
129. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 98-105 (Henry Reeve text, revised by
Francis Bowen, edited by Phillips Bradley, Vintage Books 1990) (first published in French in
1835 & 1840) (discussing individualism and explaining its "democratic origin"); see JOYCE
APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER 15 (1984) (discussing emergence of individualism
as a concept).
130. "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and
philosophers and divines." Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841), reprinted in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 262, 269 (William H. Gilman ed., 1965); see Henry David
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twentieth centuries, the American individualist ethos intensified and
transformed.131 Around the turn of the century, a developing historicist
attitude suggested that social, cultural, and political arrangements were
contingent and changeable and that human inventiveness could produce
endless progress. 132 Driven by human ingenuity, history could be a tale of
progress, not a repetitive and cyclical story of the rise and fall of one
civilization after another.1 33 Intellectuals now perceived a distinct
separation between past and present. 34 People appeared free to remake
the present and to determine the future. 3 5 Rather than being controlled
by historical principles, Americans seemed to control "historical
change." 3 6
This sense of control led politicians and scholars to emphasize
individual expertise. Before World War I, Progressives and sociological
jurisprudents had hailed the potential contributions of trained scientific
and social scientific experts. 3 7 For many Americans, this belief in the
worth of the expert grew even stronger after the war.1 38 Charles Merriam,
the leader of the University of Chicago's political science department,
argued in the 1920s that empirical methods would enable political
scientists to further human control over the future and make for a better
social world.1 39 Legal scholars (the legal realists) similarly believed that
expertise garnered through empirical studies could cure societal ills and
produce progress.1 40

Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government (1849), reprinted in 1 THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
TRADITION 307 (David A. Hollinger & Charles Capper eds., 1989) (emphasizing the priority of
individual independence and conscience over governmental control). This individualist ethos
also blossomed in the religious realm during the Second Great Awakening, which swept across
America in the first decades of the nineteenth century. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 332 (1991) (emphasizing individualist component of Second Great
Awakening).
131. See FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 18, at 100-01.
132. FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 18, at 19, 84-85; G. Edward White, The Arrival ofHistory
in ConstitutionalScholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485, 506 (2002).
133. DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 6 (1991).

Id. at xv.
Id. at 7.
Id. at xv, 3-4.
Id. at 53.
Id. at xiv-xv.

139. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS (1925); CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM
HAROLD FOOTE GOSNESLL, NON-VOTING: CAUSES AND METHODS OF CONTROL (1924).

&

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

140. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, Wage EarnerBankruptcies-Statev. FederalControl, 42
YALE L.J. 591, 593 (1933) (explaining how to improve bankruptcy system).
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Moreover, an increasing social-science emphasis on the causes of
individual behavior influenced law and political science. For instance, in
1922, Walter Lippmann contemplated the ramifications of Freudian
psychology for politics.1 41 In 1929, he observed that modern American
civilization worked "to dissolve... psychological bonds, to break up
clannishness and personal dependence."1 42 Thus, individuals tended "to
become more or less independent persons rather than to remain members
of a social organism."143 Meanwhile, when Merriam advocated that
political scientists adopt the empirical methods of science, he especially
emphasized psychology, which had advanced "from a speculative
philosophy to an experimental science, from introspection to objective
measurement."1 44 As such, psychology could provide "a much clearer view
of the human 'personality,"' and could facilitate "the understanding of the
process and the modes of control over social and political behavior." 145
To be clear, research in psychology, both from Freudian and
behaviorist perspectives, suggested that individual choices and actions
often were irrational. Harold Lasswell, a political scientist, concluded that
"[t]he findings of personality research show that the individual is a poor
judge of his own interest."1 4 6 In jurisprudence, such views led legal realists
to question whether individuals could truly follow legal principles and the
rule of law. Karl Llewellyn suggested that individual conduct constituted
the very substance of the law:
[The]

doing of something about disputes ...

is the

business of law. And the people who have the doing in
charge, whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or
jailers or lawyers, are officials of the law. What these
officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.1 47

Joseph Hutcheson, a federal judge himself, claimed that judges decide cases

141. WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 25-28 (1922).

142.

WALTER LIPPMANN, A PREFACE TO MORALS

267 (1929).

143. Id.
144. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS 95

(3d ed. 1970).

145. Charles E. Merriam, Preface to the Second Edition (1931), in NEW ASPECTS OF POLITICS

33, 39 (3d ed. 1970).
146. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS 194 (1930)).

103 (1973) (quoting

147. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 3 (1930) (emphasis omitted).

HAROLD
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based on intuitive hunches.1 48 Jerome Frank explained that these judicial
hunches arise from psychological stimuli as arbitrary as the hair color of a
witness or the nasal twang of an attorney.1 49
To a degree, the "new individualism" that emerged in the 1920s and
1930s emphasized individual choice and self-fulfillment rather than
rational self-determination.1 5 0 In fact, during this time, a developing massconsumer culture sought to capitalize on the irrationality of individuals.15 1
Advertisers aimed to reformulate individual preferences so that
purchasing particular products seemed necessary to personal satisfaction
and well-being.1 52 Individual consumers would choose to buy not because
of a rational assessment of their self-interest but because of a desire for
personal fulfillment-or so advertisers hoped.153 In 1929 and 1930, John
Dewey published a series of essays, Individualism, Old and New, which
lamented "the irony of the gospel of 'individualism."1 54 Businesses
increasingly manipulated individuals while seeming to celebrate their
individuality. 55
The United States changed significantly in the 1930s as it suffered
through the Great Depression, which facilitated the emergence of pluralist
democracy and the New Deal.15 6 Despite these changes, Americans in the
late 1940s and after became ever-more intent on personal satisfaction in
the economic marketplace, on self-fulfillment in and through their
purchases of products.15 7 Indeed, the mass-consumer culture began to
infiltrate pluralist democracy, changing it into a consumers' democracy,
where voters acted as if they were shopping for political candidates. 58
148. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., TheJudgment Intuitive: The Functionof the "Hunch"in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929).
149. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Jerome Frank, Mr. justice Holmes
and Non-EuclideanLegal Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 568, 571, 580 (1932).
150. WIEBE, supra note 127, at 185-87.
151. See id. at 197-98.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 197-98; see EDWARD L. BERNAYS, PROPAGANDA (1928) (explaining how small
number of individuals shaped desires of the masses).
154. John Dewey, Toward a New Individualism,THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 19, 1930, at 13, 1415; see John Dewey, 'America'-ByFormula, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 1929, at 117, 118. Dewey
published these and other essays in the series, in expanded form, in a book. JOHN DEWEY,
INDIVIDUALISM, OLD AND NEW (1930).

155. See id.
156. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 314-28 (discussing pluralist democracy and the New
Deal).
157. LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC 114 (2003).

158. Id. at 14; FELDMAN, supra note 3 at 337-40.
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Advanced marketing techniques transformed political campaigns into a
series of commercial-like advertisements.1 59 Americans did not object.
For the most part, during the post-World War II era, Americans celebrated
their consumers' democracy.1 60 According to Will Herberg, writing in
1955, the American way of life
synthesizes all that commends itself to the American as the
right, the good, and the true in actual life. It embraces such
seemingly incongruous elements as sanitary plumbing and
freedom of opportunity, Coca-Cola and an intense faith in
education-all felt as moral questions relating to the
proper way of life.1 61
In 1959, Vice President Richard Nixon proclaimed that the variety and
availability of consumer goods in the United States symbolized "'our right
to choose. We do not wish to have decisions made at the top by
governmental officials,' whether about [our] 'kind of house' or [our] 'kind
of ideas."'

162

In this context, a free-expression theory grounded on self-realization
and -satisfaction seemed to follow naturally. In other words, the selffulfillment rationale flowed from the practices of the consumers'
democracy. In 1963, Thomas Emerson articulated one of the earliest
scholarly statements of this rationale. 163 He began with "the widely
accepted premise of Western thought that the proper end of man is the
realization of his character and potentialities as a human being."1 64 From
this premise, Emerson reasoned that "every man-in the development of
his own personality-has the right to form his own beliefs and
opinions."16 5 Moreover, it "follows, that he has the right to express these
beliefs and opinions." 166 Free expression, in other words, is necessary to
avoid the stunting of personal development. It allows the individual "to
159. COHEN, supra note 157, at 331-32.
160. Id. at 124-25.
161. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEw 75 (1955); see Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL

TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955) (emphasizing American individualism as rooted in Lockean
philosophy).
162. COHEN, supra note 157, at 126 (quoting Nixon).
163. Toward, supra note 100.
164. Id. at 879; White, supra note 100, at 303-08, 352-57 (connecting modernist thought
with Emerson's self-fulfillment rationale).
165. Toward, supra note 100, at 879.
166. Id
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realize his potentiality as a human being." 67 Expression, Emerson
concluded, must be "an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental
exploration and of the affirmation of self."1 6 8

Other scholars would reiterate and elaborate the self-fulfillment
theory. Several have traced the concern for self-fulfillment back to
Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy, particularly his respect for the
individual dignity and autonomy of the classical liberal self.169 Charles
Fried, for one, wrote: "Freedom of expression is properly based on
autonomy: the Kantian right of each individual to be treated as an end in
himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the kingdom of ends with a right to
the greatest liberty compatible with the like liberties of all others."1 70
The justices began using the self-fulfillment rationale in the lattertwentieth century. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Justice David Souter described "the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment [to be] that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message."171 Justice Thurgood
167. Id.
168. Id. Emerson elaborated his views in a subsequent book. SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 6.
While Emerson might have been the first scholar of the pluralist democratic era to articulate the
self-fulfillment rationale, his argument resonated with the republican democratic past. During
the 1798 Sedition Act crisis, George Hay and John Thomson had developed libertarian theories
of expression. GEORGE HAY, AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (1803), reprintedin Two ESSAYS
ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (Da Capo Press 1970) (1803); JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
THE LIBERTY, AND LICENTIOUSNESS OF THE PRESS, AND THE UNCONTROULABLE NATURE OF THE HUMAN

KIND (1801). During the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, John W. Burgess, Ernst
Freund, and especially Theodore Schroeder had also articulated libertarian theories of free
expression. JOHN W. BURGESS, THE RECONCILIATION OF GOVERNMENT WITH LIBERTY 358-83 (1915);
JOHN W. BURGESS, 1 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 86-89, 178 (1890);
ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 475 (1904); THEODORE SCHROEDER, "OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12-13, 94 (De Capo Press 1972) (1911); Theodore Schroeder, Liberty of
Conscience, Speech, and Press (1906), reprinted in FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE
WARREN COURT 279 (Harold L. Nelson ed., 1967). Emerson did not cite any of these intellectual
predecessors.
169. CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 380-81; Willett, et al., Feminist Perspectives of the Self
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment
jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992).
170. Fried, supra note 169, at 233; see C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and FreeSpeech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 251 (2011) [hereinafter Baker, Autonomy] (elaborating the autonomy rationale);
Pound, supranote 80, at 453; Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IoWA L. REV.
909, 925 (1992) (proclaiming that "the function of the First Amendment is to protect expression
as critical to human self-realization"); Christina E. Wells, ReinvigoratingAutonomy: Freedom and
Responsibility in the Supreme Court's FirstAmendment jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
159, 165-70 (1997) (elaborating Kantian philosophy and its implications for free expression
jurisprudence).
171. 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). The Court at least alluded to the self-fulfillment rationale in
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Marshall captured the expansive nature of this rationale in his concurrence
in Procunierv. Martinez.172 Free expression, he wrote, "serves ... the needs
of... the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression." 173 The selffulfillment rationale was relied upon as recently as 2010.174
Ill. THE THREE PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALES IN THE DIGITAL AGE

In light of when the three philosophical rationales-search-for-truth,
self-governance,
and self-fulfillment-developed,
they all are
unsurprisingly grounded on the classical liberal self. But times change.
While the rationales might have seemed reasonable when they first arose,
in their original historical circumstances, they no longer fit in our
postmodern information society.17 5
A.

The Socially Constructed(Relational)Self

The classical liberal self is a sovereign center of power that exists
separately from society and culture. Life in the postmodern digital age,
however, underscores that the self is socially and culturally constructed. 176
In other words, one's experience of the self or identity is generated from
within cultural practices and societal structures. The self or human
consciousness is not some ultimate foundational source of control and
progress that exists prior to or outside of society and culture.1 77
1943. West Virginia State Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (invoking "a right
of self-determination in matters that touch individual opinion and personal attitude").
172. 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring).
173. Id.
174. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 466 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 248 (2002); Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). While the justices often rely on only one rationale,
they do not hesitate to use the rationales in combination. See, e.g., New York State Bd.of Elections
v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008) (combining search-for-truth and self-governance
rationales); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) (invoking
all three rationales); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (alluding to both selfgovernance and search-for-truth rationales).
175. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006) (discussing how digital
technology changes both the economy and cultural production); TURKLE, supra note 28, at 15-18
(emphasizing how digital and online technology changes our experiences).
176. COHEN, CONFIGURING, supra note 24, at 5.
177. Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1904-06; Martin & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 398.
Foucault discusses the social and historical constitution of the subject. MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); Michel Foucault, Afterword: The Subject and
Power, in HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND

HERMENEUTICS 208 (2d ed. 1983). In jurisprudence, Pierre Schlag has written about the social
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At birth, one is thrust into a preexisting yet evolving sociocultural
community. 78 One matures by absorbing the values, interests, and
expectations endorsed in that community. 7 9 The child learns both patent
and latent lessons not only from parents and other caregivers but also from
television, friends, computers, video games, and so on.18 0 The self, that is,
does not exist prior to or outside society and culture. Rather, society and
culture constitute the self and its awareness of itself and others.181
Feminist theorists emphasize that, at a fundamental level, the self is
relational rather than atomistic;1 82 "human beings are created in and
through relations with other human beings."1 83 Many feminists add that
social relations can be positive, negative, or both.1 84 A nurturing parent
can empower a child, but a manipulative and narcissistic parent can
engender an emotionally damaged child. Elaborating this point, feminists
describe the self as intersectional, "as a site constituted and fragmented, at
least partially, by the intersections of various categories of domination/
oppression such as race, gender, and sexual orientation. [One's identity,
then] is made up of the various discourses and structures that shape
society and one's experience within it."185

Life in an information society starkly magnifies the processes of social

construction of the self. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1991);
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990). Some communitarians
have also criticized the classical liberal or modernist self. ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d
ed. 1984); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
178. Martin & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 400-01.
179. See id. at 399, 402.
180. See id. at 399.
181. BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 4, at 55-56 (arguing that the self emerges only in
interaction with others); GERGEN, supra note 6, at xv ("we exist in a world of co-constitution").
182. Virginia Held, Mothering versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 287, 288-90 (Jane
Mansbridge ed., 1990) (arguing to imagine society in accord with a relationship of mothering).
183. Flax, supra note 33, at 250; see FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 94 (describing relational
or social self).
184. Willett et al., supra note 169 (discussing social and cultural relations in terms of
feminist and philosophical theories).
185. See John A. Powell, The Multiple Self Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and
Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (1997) (discussing intersectional self). See generally
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 608 (1990).
"Once we move away from the notion of subjectivity as bounded, rational and autonomous, we
embrace the idea of a socially situated and historically mediated subjectivity intersected by
gender, race, class, sexuality and other social categories." Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease,
Recognition, Resistance and Reconstruction, in THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1,
1-2 (Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease eds., 2014).
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construction, the ongoing development of the relational self.186 Individuals
literally and often self-consciously create an online self that exists in
relation to other online selves. 1

7

One's online self is unequivocally social,

cultural, and interactive. "Internet speech," writes Jack Balkin, "is a social
activity that involves exchange, give and take."1 88

Consider Facebook.

Each person creates a Facebook persona or self. You post photographs,
identify your favorite movies, music, and books, and communicate with
friends. It is thoroughly social-it is social media, after all-because one's
Facebook self always exists in relation with other Facebook selves.
Significantly, the Facebook digital structure enables each individual, with
online access, to construct this self, but the structure also channels such
self-construction. Facebook tells the user what are the appropriate
categories of information and communication.1 89
More broadly, we exist on the Internet in a "built environment," a
constructed architecture of social life.1 90 As Tim Wu puts it, the
"information environment," the structure that digital communication
industries provide for individuals, shapes how individuals can perceive
and express themselves.191 In this sense, digital technology is no different
from prior communicative or information media. An oral culture
engendered particular types of individuals and social life, distinct from
those of a scribal culture, distinct from a print culture, and distinct from
our digital culture.1 92 For instance, the development of print technology
facilitated mass communication, including the dissemination of political

186. Online technology "is bringing a set of ideas associated with postmodernism... into
everyday life." TURKLE, supra note 28, at 18.
187. See id at 14.
188. Balkin, Digital, supra note 39, at 34.
189. SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 4 (emphasizing how Google builds on human existence as
"social animals").
190. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 86 (1999).

191. Wu, supra note 8, at 13; see ANTHONY ELLIOTT, CONCEPTS OF THE SELF 143-44, 153 (3d
ed. 2014) (arguing that postmodern technology changes our sense of self and identity).
192. Lauren Langman, From Subject to Citizen to Consumer: Embodiment and the Mediation
ofHegemony, in THE POLITICS OF SELFHOOD 167, 170 (Richard Harvey Brown ed., 2003).
[D]ifferent kinds of media shape differing forms of subjectivity and the
bodies and identities that find emotional gratifications from the ideologies
that constitute them. Scribal cultures fostered subjects of the throne, print
cultures fostered citizens of the state, and electronically mediated
amusement cultures foster consumers at the mall and audiences to the

spectacles of globalized capital.
Id at 187.
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information, and thus was crucial to the development of democracy. 9 3
Significantly, digital technology, like earlier communicative technologies,
enables individuals to communicate but also simultaneously limits or
constrains them. The digital infrastructure that facilitates unprecedented
communication across the globe also facilitates surveillance and
The technology of communication, surveillance, and
suppression.
suppression are one and the same.1 94 Digital technology differs from
earlier technologies only insofar as it magnifies the influence of technology
on our experiences of our selves and our world. As Sherry Turkle explains,
her sense of self changed after she became immersed in online computer
technology; only then did she experience her self as "multiple, fluid, and
constituted...."15 More important, an online self knows there is no
escape, no outside of the Internet. One does not exist as an online self
unless one is using the Internet, and the Internet consists of a constructed
environment. There is literally no state of nature on the Internet.1 96
The conspicuousness of the socially constructed relational self in the
digital world illuminates the nature of our being or existence beyond the
Internet.1 97 In other words, the social construction of the self that we can
so readily observe on the Internet exemplifies a crucial aspect of our
overall and everyday being or existence. Whether or not we are surfing
the Internet, we emerge and exist only in relation to others, as we speak
and listen to others, as we observe and are observed by others. From the
time we are born, our most basic perceptions of others, the world, and
ourselves are generated by and from within our sociocultural context, by
and from our relations with others. The relational self cannot exist or
stand prior to or outside of society and culture. We live in a culturally

193. See FELDMAN, supra note 3, at 38 (linking the spread of suffrage to the development of
the steam-driven printing press); PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF

MODERN COMMUNICATIONS 1-2, 110 (2004) (emphasizing the connection between media
technology and political development).
194. Balkin, Regulation, supra note 39, at 2297-98, 2301-07; see BAUMAN & RAUD, supra
note 4, at 80 (arguing that Internet technology is both a "blessing and curse"); SCHNEIER, supra

note 16, at 1-7 (emphasizing how Internet corporations surveil their users).
195. TURKLE, supra note 28, at 15; see BAUMAN & RAUD, supranote 4, at 80 (emphasizing that
the Internet is now crucial to the production of our selves).
196. "If there is any place where nature has no rule, it is in cyberspace. If there is any place
that is constructed, cyberspace is it." LESSIG, supra note 190, at 24.
197. "The legal, technical, and institutional conditions that shape flows of information to,
from, and about us ... shape the sort of subjectivity that we can attain, the kinds of innovation
that we can produce, and the opportunities for creation of political and ethical meaning that we
can claim to offer." COHEN, CONFIGURING, supra note 24, at 5.
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saturated world. 198
In recent years, media professors and bloggers have been debating
about digital dualism-a debate akin to the mind-body problem of
modernist philosophy.1 99 Mind-body dualism assumes that individuals
possess both an immaterial mind-think of the classical liberal self-and
a material body. The mind-body problem asks how (or if) the immaterial
mental states of the mind can affect or control the physical actions of the
material body. 200 In a similar fashion, digital dualism sharply distinguishes
our existence online from our existence offline. 201 Offline is physical and
real. Online is virtual and secondary-or supplemental to our primary
(real) offline existence. 202 Dualism imagines that we live in a world
resembling the movie, The Matrix.203 Either we are awake and living in
reality, or we are anesthetized and dreaming in the virtual delights of the
artificial Matrix. We can cross from reality to the Matrix, and vice versa,
but we cannot be in both simultaneously. 204 Dualists often worry about
how virtual experiences (online) impinge on or detract from real life. 205
Life in the Matrix, we might say, prevents us from experiencing real life.

198. "Culture infuses individuals through the social practices of the everyday world,
shaping and forming in the most fundamental ways how humans conceive of the world and their
place within it." CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 17.
199. Nathan Jurgenson, Responding to Carr'sDigitalDualism, CYBORGOLOGY (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2013/03/01/responding-to-carrs-digital-dualism/
[https://perma.cc/SW6H-7G66] [hereinafter Jurgenson, Responding] (rejecting dualism); David
Banks,
Always
Already
Augmented,
CYBORGOLOGY
(Mar.
1,
2013),
https://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2013/03/01/always-already-augmented/
[https://perma.cc/5EGY-3T8S] (rejecting dualism); Nicholas Carr, Digital Dualism Denialism,
ROUGH TYPE (Feb. 27, 2013 ), http://www.roughtype.com/?p=2090 [https://perma.cc/4X7Q9BNV] (supporting dualism); Nathan Jurgenson, Digital Dualism versus Augmented Reality,
CYBORGOLOGY (Feb. 24, 2011), http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2011/02/24/digitaldualism-versus-augmented-reality/ [https://perma.cc/666-QJ5W] [hereinafter Jurgenson,
Augmented] (articulating alternative to dualism).
200. See FELDMAN, VOYAGE, supra note 18, at 22-23 (tying Cartesian dualism to Protestant
Reformation); D. W. HAMLYN, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 135-43 (1987) (rooting mindbody dualism in Descartes); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHYAND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 45-61 (1979)

(rejecting mind-body dualism); JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIETY 39-45 (1998)
(critiquing the mind-body problem from analytical perspective).
201. See Jurgenson, Augmented, supra note 199; Carr, supra note 199; Jurgenson,
Responding, supra note 199
202. Jurgenson, Augmented, supra note 199; see Carr, supra note 199.
203. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999).
204. Jurgenson, Augmented, supra note 199.
205. NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS (2010) (criticizing the effects of digital technology);
SHERRY TURKLE,
relationships).

ALONE TOGETHER

(2011)

(arguing

online

relationships

undermine

real
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Numerous commentators, however, question digital dualism. To be
sure, we experience being offline and online in different ways, at least
partially. 206 Even so, our experiences offline and online are-and always
have been-characterized by intersubjective communication and the
exchange of information. In other words, we have always lived in a
sociocultural context-in a world of information media-even if the
existing media were no more complex than the spoken voice. 207 Online and
offline experiences differ, then, only in degree and not in kind, if or when
they differ at all. As one computer gamer said, "RL [real life] is just one
more window." 208 Online and offline intermingle in the experience of the
relational self.20 9

"Interaction on Facebook is different than at a coffee shop," writes
Nathan Jurgenson, "but both Facebook and the coffee shop inhabit one
reality." 2 1 0 In fact, an individual's Facebook profile reflects elements of
offline experience, just as offline behavior can change because of Facebook
experiences. 211 In our digital age, online and offline experiences intertwine
experientially and temporally. Suppose I am at a coffee shop with my wife,
and my smartphone buzzes. I look at it and see that I have received a text
from our son. I read the text to my wife, and we discuss how to reply. I
then text a response to our son. Is my experience online or offline? As I
watch my wife eat her sticky bun, I decide to take a Snapchat photo of her
and send it, via my smartphone, to our son and daughter. They both
respond with their own Snapchat photos, which I save with screen shots.
My wife and I then drive home, sit together in front of a computer, open
our joint Facebook account and add the saved Snapchat photos of our
children. Are we living online or offline? From my perspective, I am deeply
enmeshed in intersubjective relationships, especially with my family, with
those relationships unfolding on media both online and offline. 212
When we-you, me, and anyone else-momentarily look away from

206. See Carr, supra note 199 (emphasizing the differences between online and offline
experiences).
207. Jurgenson, Responding, supra note 199; Banks, supra note 199.
208. TURKLE, supra note 28, at 13.
209. Id. at 14, 21-22.
210. Jurgenson, Responding, supra note 199.
211. Jurgenson,Augmented, supra note 199.
212. Thus, numerous commentators now reject the concept of cyberspace because it
suggests digital dualism, as if cyberspace were distinct from reality. E.g., GRIMMELMANN, supra
note 5, at 10-12. "The spatial metaphor of 'cyberspace' is and always has been misleading."
Banks, supra note 199.
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our computers, tablets, and smart phones, we do not transform into
classical liberal selves. Rather, we always are and have been socially
constructed relational selves. Our experience online accentuates an aspect
of our existence that previously might have been obscure but was
nonetheless present. Even if the classical liberal self appeared to fit in
certain historical circumstances, its sharp separation of the self from
sociocultural context was always a myth. 213 And if the classical liberal self
does not exist, then the three traditional philosophical rationales resting
on this ostensible foundation can no longer stand. Both the search-fortruth and self-governance rationales treat speech as an instrument. The
classical liberal self, a sovereign source of power and control, uses speech
as a tool to achieve the self s desired goals: either the identification of truth
or democratic self-government. But if the self is relational and socially
constructed, if the self is not as atomistic and independent as classical
liberalism theorizes, then any such use of expression is far more complex
than the rationales acknowledge. Using speech is not the same as using a
hammer to drive a nail into wood (an action that itself is more complicated
than we typically realize). Communication through speech and writing is
an inherently intersubjective (relational) activity that necessarily builds
on preexisting culture but also reconstructs and adds to that culture.214
Meanwhile, the self-fulfillment rationale views the self as preexisting and
in search of fulfillment or realization. But the social construction of the
relational self suggests that the self is always in an ongoing process of
emerging or becoming. The self does not realize its preexisting potential;
it continually emerges through interaction with society and culture,
through engagement with others. 215

213. "[T]he liberal self who is the subject of privacy theory and privacy policymaking does
not exist." Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1905; see Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism:An
Overview from GeneralConstitutionalLaw, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637 (2015) (arguing that FirstAmendment Internet issues should not be treated as exceptional).
214. Habermas rejects the atomistic and instrumental self precisely because
communication and discourse are social actions that are crucial to our beings. JORGEN HABERMAS,
1 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984); JORGEN HABERMAs, 2 THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987); see JAMES GORDON FINLAYSON,

HABERMAS 51 (2005) (explaining Habermas's concept of lifeworld); Stephen M. Feldman, The
Problem of Critique: TriangulatingHabermas, Derrida, and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4
CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 296 (2005) (explaining Habermas in comparison with Gadamer and
Derrida).
215. BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 4, at 132-33; NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 50; Edward
McGushin, Foucault'sTheory and PracticeofSubjectivity, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 127,
141 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011).
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The Collapseof the TraditionalPublic-PrivateDichotomy

The three philosophical rationales assume that the classical liberal self
is a source of sovereign power. In theory, then, the absence or limitation
Without government
of government maximizes individual liberty.
restriction, the selfs sovereign power supposedly has free rein. This
public-private dichotomy animates free-expression doctrine (and much of
constitutional law, in general). Government, from the public sphere, is
understood to threaten individual rights and liberties, while the private
216
This theoretical
sphere is supposedly the realm of individual freedom.
libertarian and
for
basis
is
the
private
and
division between public
neoliberal ideology, which celebrates private-sphere freedom and
denigrates government. 217 In the digital age, however, this traditional
public-private dichotomy collapses.
Because of the technological structure of the Internet, online
communicative expression always passes through intermediaries. At the
simplest level, an Internet speaker (or writer) must rely on an ISP merely
to get online. But many other intermediaries can be involved, depending
on the type of media and online activity. 218 These intermediaries can bar
content, direct users in particular directions, tailor results to individual
219
No matter
users, and otherwise control the individual's experience.
whether one is using Facebook, YouTube, Google, or Amazon, the
experience can be controlled and channeled. Online sellers have an
obvious interest in collecting information about individual consumers and
then directing those consumers to purchases. Internet architecture allows
merchants and advertisers "to use information they already possess or can
easily buy to tailor what they say, how they say it, and to whom they say
it."220 And merchants and advertisers use that capability frequently and
capaciously. "Advertisers using software that tracks user identities across
the Internet can select advertisements for individual users that appeal to
their tastes, preferences, heuristics, and biases." 221 For instance, I shopped

216. See F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80-81 (50th Anniversary ed., 1994).
217. E.g., id at 16-17 (articulating libertarian position); DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF
THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS (2012) (discussing the

development and influence of neoliberalism).
218. Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 244-47 (2014).
219. Id.; see SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 54-72 (discussing the corporate business of
surveillance).
220. Tutt, supra note 218, at 244.
221. Id.; see SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 58-59, 130 (emphasizing advertising as business
model for Internet businesses and the tailoring of pop-up advertisements based on browsing
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online for an office chair six months ago and have been bombarded ever
since with pop-up advertisements for office chairs.
Algorithms ranking search results are readily manipulated. 222 "You are
what you search," writes Carl Franzen. 223 "That's definitely the case on
Google, where any search query turns up a personalized set of results
based upon your prior Google search history data, even if you're
completely logged out of your Google account." 224 Consequently, different
users will reach different results when entering identical search terms,
whether they are shopping for shirts or researching politically
controversial topics like abortion. 225 In fact, corporate websites will
charge different users different prices for the same product based on the
accumulated surveillance data for the respective users. 226 And when a
meme-a discrete cultural unit often referring to an Internet concept or
idea-goes viral on the Internet, its popularity often is managed or
produced. 227 It is not a spontaneous or haphazard event. 2 2 8 In short, the
Internet is a controlled environment.
Significantly, most of these Internet intermediaries are corporations,
often MNCs. In the early years of the Internet, at least until the mid-1990s,
many participants and observers believed the Net was beyond control,
either by the government or by massive corporations bent on
monopolization. 229 As James Grimmelmann points out, "computers are
general-purpose devices, capable of carrying out all kinds of tasks,
including ones their designers never dreamed of." 2 30 In particular, many
early personal computers (PCs) were open and flexible; the Apple II is a
prototypical example of a machine that encouraged tinkering and

history).
222. An algorithm is "a step-by-step process for carrying out a calculation." GRIMMELMANN,
supra note 5, at 25.
223. Carl Franzen, ImpersonalGoogle Search Results Are Few and FarBetween, DuckDuckGo
Finds, TPM (Oct. 15, 2012), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/idealab/impersonal-google-searchresults-are-few-and-far-between-duckduckgo-finds [https://perma.cc/WN88-VMV3].
224. Id.
225. See Tutt, supra note 218, at 274 (discussing algorithms).
226. SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 128-30.
227. MIKE HAWKINS, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1860-1945, at

16 (1997) (defining meme).
228. Doug Bock Clark, The Bot Bubble: How Click FarmsHave Inflated Social Media Currency,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 20, 2015); Tutt, supra note 220, at 274.
229. LESSIG, supra note 190, at 4-5.
230. GRIMMELMANN, supra note 5, at 24.
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experimentation. 231 Likewise, the early Internet was accessible and
adaptable to multiple uses. 2 3 2 When the PCs were linked together via the
Internet, digital technology became an incredible font of individual
creativity and social exchange. Jonathan Zittrain aptly calls the early PCs
and Internet "generative." 233 Their architectures, especially when
conjoined, invited anyone and everyone to innovate, build, and contribute
to the ever-changing digital environment. 234 One innovation could be the
foundation for another innovation, and those two together could generate
yet additional innovations. The Internet appeared to be a collection or web
of peers with no one in charge or control.235 Turkle described this young
236
Internet as "a dizzyingly free zone."

Zittrain contrasts the generative early Internet with the proprietary
networks, such as America Online (AOL) and Prodigy, which prospered
through much of the 1990s. 2 3 7 These proprietary networks were closed
systems that individuals paid to enter because they supposedly offered
users unique and worthwhile content.238 Such closed systems, however,
were non-generative or "sterile." 239 The corporate owners believed that,
for purposes of profits, they needed to keep the systems controlled and
exclusive, thus discouraging interaction and innovation. But ultimately,
these sterile systems could not compete with the generative system of the
open Internet. In 2000, AOL and Time Warner announced a celebrated
merger of media giants, but soon afterward, the speed and openness of
Internet broadband services rendered AOL and other proprietary services
obsolete. 240
As the years passed, though, entrepreneurs realized the Internet was
leaving money on the table. They learned how to harness the Internet for
profit. It became apparent that unfettered individual freedom, initiative,
and inventiveness are not inherent to online (Internet) architectures, even
231. Wu, supra note 8, at 275-77; JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND

How TO STOP IT 2-3 (2008) [hereinafter ZITTRAIN, FUTURE]; Jonathan Zittrain, The Internet is
Closing to Innovation, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL (Nov. 8, 2008).
232. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 231, at 3.
233. Id. at 2-4, 70-74.
234. Id. at 3.
235. Paul Ford, Reboot the World, NEW REPUBLIC, July/Aug. 2016, at 18, 19-20.
236. TURKLE, supra note 28, at 246.
237. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 231, at 3, 81; see LESSIG, supra note 191, at 66-71
(describing America Online).
238. See LESSIG, supra note 191, at 67.
239. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 231, at 3.
240. WU, supra note 8, at 257-68 (describing the rapid and surprising collapse of AOL).
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outside the old proprietary networks. 241 Rather, the architecture itself, the
"built environment," 242 determines the degree of individual autonomy as
well as government and corporate control. 243 And the manipulation of that
architecture helped usher in the mass commercialization of the Internet.244
What other factors commercialized the Internet and led to the creation
of MNCs? The need for capital was one. The equipment and know-how
necessary to manage and link massive amounts of information or data,
such as is needed for an ISP or a search engine like Google, is expensive
and requires heavy capital investment, which of course leads to the
corporate form.245 Moreover, the Internet itself facilitated the rapid
development of MNCs over the last twenty-five years. 246 The advanced
communication technologies, together with advanced transportation
technologies and the "free mobilization of capital," allow corporations to
produce and sort information, to mine data, and to otherwise create or
manufacture products wherever labor costs are low and environmental
restrictions are lax and then to sell such products where incomes are
high. 2 4 7 Plus, the corporations can still locate their offices where taxes are
minimal, the views are enticing, the culture is exciting, or anywhere else.
Indeed, because of the combined corporate capabilities to shift capital and
to ship their respective products rapidly around the world, corporations
can pressure nations to minimize labor demands, lower taxes, and
diminish environmental regulations. 248
Digital technology has created massive new markets for the products
of these MNCs. Millions of people around the world stream media,
purchase DVDs, use Facebook, and buy from Amazon. Information, data,
and media, today, are sources of enormous wealth. 249 Most important, Big
Data has become big business. 250 The corporate gathering, processing, and
241. See LESSIG, supra note 190, at 88-89.
242. Id. at 86.
243. Id. at 5-6.
244. Id. at 102-04 (discussing the commercialization of the Internet).
245. Tutt, supra note 218, at 247-48; see Barton Gellman et al., How the NSA is Infiltrating
Private Networks, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 2013 (depicting graphically the Google system,
including front-end servers and data centers).
246. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 74-76 (2013).

247. Id. at 75; JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION 22-25 (2004); Brian Roach, A Primer on
Multinational Corporations,in LEVIATHANS 19, 35-36 (Alfred D. Chandler & Bruce Mazlish eds.,
2005).
248. STIGLITZ, supra note 246, at 74-77.
249. Balkin, Digital,supra note 39, at 13-14.
250. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY 5-6, 19 (2015).
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analysis of data, including metadata, can be mined for profits in multiple
ways. 251 Most online users believe they access nearly all websites with no
strings attached, but in reality, users gain such access only because they
simultaneously relinquish data about their personalities and habits-data
that corporations can turn into profits. 252 As Bruce Schneier explains: "If
something is free [on the Internet], you're not the customer; you're the
product." 2 5 3 In other words, Internet MNCs-search engines, social media

sites, and so forth-effectively sell their users to advertisers, which
attempt to steer the users to other websites where they can purchase
products and services. 254 We (Internet users) are like cattle. MNCs feed us
with website access and information-and we happily think such access is
the point-but in reality, we are being cultivated for slaughter, for sale as
a product to another business entity. With so much money being made
from online data-gathering and related businesses, we have unsurprisingly
reached a point where several MNCs are practically synonymous with
segments of the Internet: Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, and
Amazon are among the most renowned. The leading ISPs, Verizon,
Comcast, and AT&T, are also MNCs. 2 5 5 Yet, it is worth adding that many
corporations engaged in mass surveillance are relatively unknown. 256
The heavy corporate presence on the Internet threatens free
expression. 25 7 Nowadays, corporations generally have one goal: to
maximize profits. Business consultant and professor, Peter Drucker,
declared, "If you find an executive who wants to take on social
responsibilities, fire him. Fast." 25 8 MNCs, in particular, do not care about

251. SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 6-7, 39. Metadata is "data about data-information a
computer system uses to operate or data that's a by-product of that operation. In a text message
system, the messages themselves are data, but the accounts that sent and received the message,
and the date and time of the message, are all metadata." Id at 17.
252. Id. at49-53.
253. Id. at 53.
254. Id. at 46-61.
255. John Ribeiro, Verizon Enters India's Long-Distance Telecom Market, NETWORK WORLD
(Feb. 7, 2007); Gagan Mehra, 32 Leading InternetService Providers, PRACTICAL ECOMMERCE (Mar.
12, 2015); Numerous lists of MNCs are available on the Internet. E.g., Abby Rogers, The 25 Best
MultinationalCompanies to Work For, BusINESS INSIDER (Oct. 28, 2011).
256. SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 48.
257. See Deven R. Desai, ConstitutionalLimits on Surveillance:Associational Freedom in the
Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 590-91 (2014) (focusing on constitutional
issues related to surveillance); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015)
(explaining empirical study showing that surveillance chills free expression).
258. BAKAN, supra note 247, at 35 (quoting Drucker); see Milton Friedman, The Social
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democracy, the health of nation-states, or issues of government. MNCs
care only about the maximization of profits, regardless of where they can
be accrued. 259 The massive intermediary-MNCs therefore control and
readily suppress online expression for their own purposes-profit.260
They have no principled concern for the First Amendment. If it is to their
benefit (profit) to invoke the First Amendment, they will do so. If it is to
their benefit (profit) to suppress expression, then they will do so. MNCs
manipulate the First Amendment and channel individual freedoms for
business purposes only.2 6 1 Thus, in one instance, Google might insist that
its search algorithms and results are expressive content protected as free
expression. 2 62 But in another instance, Google might maintain that it
merely provides a conduit or pipeline for content supplied by others. As
such, Google would enjoy diminished first-amendment protection, but it
would also be relieved of any liability for defamatory messages. 263 To be
sure, despite the looming presence of corporate power on the Internet,
digital technologies and online communication remain sources of
creativity and social exchange. Yet, the existence or protection of free
expression in the digital age "depends far less on our abstract values than
on the structure of the communications and culture industries. We
sometimes treat information industries as if they were like any other
enterprise, but they are not, for their structure determines who gets
heard." 264

Without doubt, government might still suppress expression or gather
massive amounts of information about citizens. The Edward Snowden
revelations about the National Security Agency (NSA) and its incredible
collection of metadata demonstrate the potential for such government

Responsibility ofBusiness is to Increase its Profits, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 13, 1970).
259. KENICHI OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE 2-5 (1995).

260. PASQUALE, supra note 250, at 5; Wu, supra note 8, at 205-06.
261. See Crawford, supra note 13, at 2375-78 (emphasizing invocation of First Amendment
for profit); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2010, 2032-33 (2013) (emphasizing the use of Big Data for profit).
262. PASQUALE, supra note 250, at 3-6.
263. Id at 77-78; see Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013) (arguing
against full search-engine first-amendment protection); EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST
AMENDMENT

PROTECTION

FOR

SEARCH

ENGINE

SEARCH

RESULTS

(2012),

http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C64D-88LR] (arguing for constitutional protection of search engine results).
Not incidentally, Google commissioned the Volokh and Falk paper.
264. WU, supra note 8, at 13.

2017]1

POSTMODERN FREE EXPRESSION

1161

abuse of digital technology. 265 But a crucial point to understand is that, in
the digital age, it is not only the government that can widely suppress
expression or manipulate information. Suppression in the digital age
Often, the
transcends the traditional public-private dichotomy. 266
government enlists the assistance of private corporations in monitoring
and gathering data about citizens. 267 But even without government
involvement, corporations constantly control expression, gather
information, and manipulate individuals-all in pursuit of corporate
profit. And even while corporations gather massive amounts of data about
individuals-data that they sell or use to generate profits-those same
corporations will jealously hide their algorithms as trade secrets-which
of course generate profits. 268 In the words of Frank Pasquale, Big Data
corporations are "black boxes." 269 Data goes in, information comes out (for
profit), but we have no idea what goes on inside, as the corporate
270
algorithms churn.

The concept of the classical liberal self and the three philosophical
rationales for free expression assume that the absence of government
regulation maximizes individual liberty. But in the digital age, this
assumption is patently false. MNCs have the means-control of digital
architecture-and the motive-profit-to manipulate, coerce, and
suppress individuals. Individual liberty is, to a large degree, a matter of
corporate discretion. Thus, for instance, according to the search-for-truth
rationale, if the government is precluded from infringing on the
marketplace of ideas, then individuals will freely contribute ideas until the
truth emerges. 271 But now, MNCs channel and limit the ideas that can be

265. PASQUALE, supra note 250, at 50-51 (discussing Snowden's revelations); Barton
Gellman, Edward Snowden, After Months of NSA Revelations, Says His Mission's Accomplished,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 23, 2013; Kennedy Elliott & Terri Rupar, Six Months ofRevelations on NSA,
WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 23, 2013.

266. PASQUALE, supra note 250, at 10 ("the distinction between state and market is fading");
SCHNE[ER, supra note 16, at 6 (emphasizing a "public-private surveillance partnership"); Neil M.
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935, 1951-52 (2013) (arguing

that "surveillance transcends the public/private divide") (emphasis omitted).
267. PASQUALE, supra note 250, at 21, 45; SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 121-22; Balkin,

Regulation, supra note 39, at 2297-98, 2305, 2324-25; Richards, supra note 266, at 1940-41.
268. PASQUALE, supra note 250, at 3-6.
269. Id.
270. Pasquale also analogizes Big Data corporations to one-way mirrors. "Important
corporate actors have unprecedented knowledge of the minutiae of our daily lives, while we
know little to nothing about how they use this knowledge to influence the important decisions
that we-and they-make." Id. at 9.

271. See supra Part II.A.
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contributed to public intercourse on the Internet. From the corporate
perspective, truth (or self-governance or self-fulfillment) is no more
valuable than is individual liberty. All such notions are subservient to the
only real corporate value: profit. Yet, if an individual were to challenge
corporate control over expression as violating the First Amendment, the
corporation has a ready answer. It is not a state actor, and therefore, the
constitutional limitations of the First Amendment do not apply. 2 72
In sum, the three philosophical rationales arose in specific historical
contexts. All were based on the existence of the classical liberal
(modernist) self. But in the context of the digital age, the three rationales
are no longer apt. The idea of the classical liberal self enjoying maximum
liberty in a private sphere does not fit our information society. The digital
age underscores that the self is socially constructed and that the traditional
public-private dichotomy has collapsed, at least insofar as it relates to free
expression. 273
IV. A SELF-EMERGENCE RATIONALE FOR FREE EXPRESSION

Although the primary philosophical rationales for free expression do
not comport with our current circumstances, we should not conclude that
free expression itself has no justifiable place in the digital age. To the
contrary, we must reimagine the importance of free expression in a world
of digital technology. If the self is relational and socially constructed, if the
traditional public-private dichotomy has collapsed, then why is the
constitutional protection of free expression significant?
A.

RelationalAutonomy and the Self-Emergence Rationale
The importance of free expression arises from a proper conception of
the self as an emergent social being. Unlike the classical liberal self, the
emergent self is socially constructed. It neither preexists society and
culture nor stands as a sovereign and independent source of power.
Rather, the self is fundamentally relational. The self "is in basic ways
constituted by networks of relationships of which they are a part272. E.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-03579-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 4269304 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2010) (dismissing claim against Facebook because of lack of state action); see Mark
Tushnet, Introduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the Information Economy, 127
HARV. L. REv. 2234, 2253-58 (2014) (emphasizing state-action doctrine issues).
273. Wu suggests the irrelevance of the three philosophical rationales to the practical
experience of free expression in the digital age. "The public square is a fine conceit," he writes,
"but in an information society it matters little that one is free to speak one's mind in public; the
public square, if it exists, is an information network nowadays." Wu, supra note 8, at 306.
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networks that range from intimate relations with parents, friends, or
lovers to relations between student and teacher, welfare recipient and
caseworker, citizen and state, to being participants in a global economy."2 74
The emergence of the relational self is an ongoing creative and dynamic
process. The process is ongoing because our selves neither fully form at
birth nor finish developing at some specific age, as might be suggested by
rituals (often religious) that supposedly mark passage into adulthood.275
The emergence of the self, we might say, ends only at death. "Human
beings are in a constant process of becoming, in interaction with the many
layers of relationship in which they are embedded." 276 The process is
creative and dynamic because it does not follow a set of predetermined
and mechanical steps. 277 It is not rote. As the self emerges, the process of
emergence adjusts and transforms, depending on the self and its
surroundings. The self that emerges has consciousness, including selfconsciousness, reflexivity, memory, and imagination. 278 The self therefore
participates in its own creation. 279
The intersubjective or social existence of the self, in relation to and
with others, is crucial for understanding autonomy. From the time of birth,
we are constantly being normalized and modulated, pushed and pulled by
social and cultural forces that often operate invisibly. 280 Think of
radioactive rays. Their wavelengths are beyond those perceivable by
human eyes. 281 We do not see them, yet they not only exist but also can
274. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 19.

Judith Butler adds that the relational self seeks

recognition from others. We cannot simply choose who we want to be. In a sense, each
individual negotiates with other individuals in an effort to be recognized in particular ways or
roles, as a friend, a lover, a scholar, an artist, an actor, a writer, an athlete, and so on. JUDITH
BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 131-51 (2004); see AMY ALLEN, THE POLITICS OF OUR SELVES 173-74
(2008) (discussing Butler and recognition); JEFFREY NEALON & SUSAN SEARLS GIROUX, THE THEORY

TOOLBox 43, 261 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing recognition).
275. "[Tlhe idea of selfhood as an on-going process, a lived practice, something we do
rather than are." BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 4, at 132.

276. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 38.
277. Martin & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 400; see Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1905
(referring to "dynamic, emergent subjectivity"). "People are born into networks of relationships,
practices, and beliefs, and over time they encounter and experiment with others, engaging in a
diverse and ad hoc mix of practices that defies neat theoretical simplification." Cohen, Privacy,
supra note 24, at 1910.
278. Martin & Sugarman, supra note 23, at 401-02; see NEALON &GIROUX, supra note 275, at
48 (explaining that the self is not a mere "passive receptor").
279. See BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 44, at 102 (discussing self-creation); NEDELSKY, supra
note 38, at 167-70 (same).
280. See Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1915 (explaining modulation).
281. Types

of

Radiation,

RADIATION

ANSWERS

(2007),
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affect our bodies. 282 The forces of social construction are similar-they
affect us whether or not we know it-though they are not necessarily
damaging or harmful. 28 3 In fact, the forces of social construction can be
positive, negative, or both concurrently. Cultural and social forces both
empower and limit us. 2 8 4 We are empowered, for instance, because we are

acculturated to speak a particular language (or languages). We can
directly interact with others who speak the same language. But
simultaneously, we are limited because we cannot speak other languages.
Autonomy lies in the space between the empowering and limiting
effects of sociocultural forces. It is a capacity to participate in the ongoing
and dynamic process of self-creation. 285 Most important, then, autonomy
itself is relational. Our relationships can facilitate the development of a
capacity for self-creation and self-determination-for self-emergence. 286
Autonomy cannot exist unless it arises from "human connections,
including those manifested in love, friendship, appropriate care, and even
loyalty and devotion." 287 Even further, autonomy does not merely arise
from but is dependent upon social relations. 288 Autonomy, in other words,
is "a mode of interacting with others."289 Because self-emergence is an
ongoing creative and dynamic process, it is always in relation with and to
others. If one is to exercise a capacity for self-creation and selfdetermination (in one's self-emergence), it can occur only within a social
context. It cannot happen in isolation. 290
Consider an actor in a play.2 9 1 The actor is given a script, which limits
http://www.radiationanswers.org/radiation-introduction/types-of-radiation.html
[https://perma.cc/8CQR-8PWZ] ("Radiation waves are generally invisible.").
282. See id.
283. Pierre Bourdieu argues that personal dispositions adjust to the logic of societal
positions. PIERRE BOURDIEU, IN OTHER WORDS: ESSAYS TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY (Matthew

Adamson trans., 1990); Pierre Bourdieu & Loc J.D. Wacquant, The PurposeofReflexive Sociology,
in AN INVITATION To REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 61, 74, 81 (1992).

284. CUSHMAN, supranote 4, at 350.
285. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 4-6, 19-21; NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 45.
286. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 4-6, 19-21.
287. VELTMAN, supra note 38, at 4.
288. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 46.
289. Id at 55; see Pallotta-Chiarolli & Pease, supra note 185, at 5 ("agency is not an attribute
of a subject or something that someone has, but is rather a relationship that is enacted in the
world").
290. "Relations are ... constitutive of autonomy rather than conditions for it." NEDELSKY,
supranote 38, at 46.
291. See NEALON & GIROUX, supra note 274, at 265 (discussing agency in relation to reading
Shakespeare).
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the actor's possibilities. An actor playing Macbeth in the Shakespearean
tragedy confronts different constraints than an actor playing Max
Bialystock in The Producers. Yet, in either Macbeth or The Producers, the
script also empowers or enables the actor to become the respective
character. Without the script, the actor cannot be Macbeth or Bialystock.
That empowerment invests the actor with a degree of autonomy. To be
sure, the actor is limited, whether playing Macbeth or Bialystock, but each
actor nonetheless enjoys a capacity to interpret the character. Zero Mostel
and Nathan Lane embody different Bialystocks. The script, that is, does not
reduce the actor to a mechanical puppet. 29 2 And quite clearly, neither
Mostel nor Lane can play Bialystock unless he is immersed in a network of
relationships, with the other actors in the play, with the director, with the
stage crew, and so on.
In short, an appreciation for the relational self is central to
understanding autonomy. Under the traditional philosophical rationales,
freedom or autonomy equates with liberation of the classical liberal self so
that the self can enjoy and express its independence and self-reliance. 293
The self-fulfillment rationale, in particular, maintains that the classical
liberal self must be able to speak or write to fulfill or satisfy its preexisting
From this modernist perspective, social
and inherent nature. 294
construction is a threat to autonomy. 295 How can one be free if social and
cultural forces are shaping and limiting one's expression?
But in truth, we can exercise autonomy only in the context of social
relationships. Autonomy is always relational autonomy. As Jennifer
Nedelsky writes: "What is essential to the development of autonomy is not
protection against intrusion, but constructive relationship." 296
Consequently, because all social relations and forces are partly
empowering and partly limiting, autonomy is always a matter of degree. 297
292. The emergent self is "both socially and culturally constructed ... and capable of
critique and of critically directed self-constitution and social transformation." Allen, supra note
274, at 177; see Benhabib, supra note 34, at 110-11 (emphasizing the need to conceptualize
agency).
293. CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 30-31; Willett et al., supra note 169.
294. See Part l.
295. See Dianna Taylor, Introduction:Power, Freedom and Subjectivity, in MICHEL FOUCAULT:
KEY CONCEPTS 1, 2 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011) (describing this criticism as it is applied to Foucault).
296. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 98.
297. Id. at 46; Susan J. Brison, Relational Autonomy and Freedom of Expression, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 280, 284-86 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); Marilyn
Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 35, 41 (Catriona
Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
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Any particular vector of social force has both positive and negative spins
or connotations. An autonomous individual must have the capacity to
evaluate the positives and negatives of various vectors. 298 This evaluation
cannot be reduced to a simple cost-benefit analysis; rather it requires a
developed capacity to judge complex social relations. 299 If a particular
vector of social force is manipulative or coercive, then its limiting effects
probably would offset any empowering or enabling effects.300 An
autonomous individual-to maintain autonomy-would, then, not only
need to judge that particular social force or relation as diminishing to
autonomy but would also need to have sufficient power (wealth,
bureaucratic position, and so forth) to resist or reject that relationship.3 0
Expanding on this geometrical metaphor, it is useful to describe
autonomy as requiring space. 302 Autonomous space is not for individual
isolation, for protection behind fences. Rather, it is a sociocultural space
open for empowering interactions with others, where one can exercise a
capacity for self-emergence.
A caring and nurturing parent-child
relationship would be a prototypical example of a relationship generating
space for autonomous thought and conduct. Autonomous space facilitates
the ongoing creative and dynamic process of becoming, opening to the
most profound levels of self-creation and self-determination.30 3 It is not
mere freedom to buy a product-though such marketplace action might
manifest autonomy-rather, it is freedom to experiment, to change, and to

298. Bourdieu emphasizes fields of power. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a
Sociology oftheJuridicalField, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987) (focusing on legal profession); DAVID
SWARTZ, CULTURE AND POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU 117-42 (1997) (discussing

Bourdieu and entry into a field of power).
299. For characterizations of autonomy as a capacity, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 4-6,
19-21; NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 45.
300. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 4-6, 19-21 (emphasizing coercion and manipulation);
NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 98 (arguing to protect "constructive relationships")
301. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 5 (arguing that autonomy requires ability to overcome
"interfering conditions"); Brison, supra note 297, at 283-84 (emphasizing that "personal,
familial, social, political, and economic relations with others are what enable or inhibit our access
to a range of significant options").
302. See ELLIOTT, supra note 191, at 157 (arguing that some postmodernists, drawing on
psychoanalysis, emphasize the "enlarging of psychic space").
303. Michel Foucault, The Ethic of Carefor the Self as the Practiceof Freedom (J.D. Gauthier
trans., 1984), in THE FINAL FOUCAULT 1, 2-3 (James Bernauer & David Rasmussen eds., 1988)
(discussing the care of the self as a practice of freedom); see McGushin, supra note 215, at 13435, 141 (emphasizing that the Foucauldian self, as in the care of the self, is not the modernist

foundational self).
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continue to become or emerge.30 4 This type of open space, facilitating
individual transformation, is especially important in our postmodern or
"liquid" society of accelerated change-of digital technology, of rapid and
frequent travel, of changing and multiple jobs, of global capital, of
multitasking, of Bitcoin, of Airbnb, of Uber, and on and on ad infinitum.305
We do not live in the world of a post-World War II sitcom, like Leave It to
Beaver, where an individual's job, gender role, economic status, and social
position in general appeared relatively stable, if not fixed.
It is worth reiterating and emphasizing that not all relationships are
the same vis-A-vis autonomy. Some relationships are better or worse.3 06
Relational autonomy is always a matter of degree.30 7 Autonomy is never a
matter of metaphysical or ultimate liberation from social construction and
relations.3 08 Therefore, autonomy requires a space sufficient to allow an
individual to evaluate different relationships and to continue participating
in the ongoing and dynamic process of self-emergence. Autonomy or
freedom, explains the feminist philosopher Dianna Taylor, is "the ability to
navigate power relations in ways that mediate against and attempt to
minimize constraints (such as direction and management) while
maximizing capacities, rather than ... the ability to extricate oneself from
relations of power."3 0 9 For example, an autonomous individual would seek
relationships that are mutual and reciprocal, where other individuals do
not seek to manipulate, deceive, or coerce her or him-and also vice versa,
where one is not manipulating, deceiving, or coercing others.31 0 Such
relationships depend on and engender autonomy, while manipulative,
deceptive, and coercive relationships usually undermine autonomy.3 1

304. Todd May, Foucault'sConception of Freedom, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 71,
77-81 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011) (arguing that Foucault, in his later writings, suggested an
opening of space for or of freedom). Julie Cohen writes similarly about privacy. Privacy "enables
situated subjects to navigate within preexisting cultural and social matrices, creating spaces for
the play and the work of self-making." Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1911.
305. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID MODERNITY (2000); BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 4, at 10.

306. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 122-23.
307. Id. at 46.
308. See id. at 115-17.
309. Dianna Taylor, Practices of the Self in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 173, 180
(Dianna Taylor ed., 2011).
310. Allen, supra note 35, at 175-79.
311. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 4-6, 19-21 (emphasizing avoidance of coercion and
manipulation). Amy Allen especially emphasizes relationships of "mutual recognition." Allen,
supra note 35, at 179. Allen synthesizes Foucault, Jilrgen Habermas, Butler, and Seyla Benhabib.
Id. at 1-10.
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The concept of relational autonomy underscores that free expression
is crucial to the individual emergent self in its ongoing process of creative
and dynamic development. Because autonomy is inherently relational, it
cannot exist without intersubjective communication and interaction. The
emergent self must have free expression in order to develop and maintain
its autonomy. The flip side is that free expression cannot exist without the
nurturing of positive (empowering) relations and protection against
destructive or limiting relations. That is, expression is not free unless the
individual is embedded within a set of relations appropriate for the
development and support of autonomy.312
Disputes between modern and postmodern theorists often devolve
into disputes over the appropriate questions. For instance, modernist
philosophers asked how the independent and isolated self could access
firm epistemological foundations for knowledge.313
Postmodern
philosophers disregard that question and instead investigate the process
of interpretation. 314 To understand free expression in the digital or
postmodern age, we must ask different questions from those asked in the
modern era, including most of the twentieth century.3 15 And as Zygmunt

312. The concept of emergence underscores that social and cultural forces do not
completely determine the nature of the self. Autonomy is possible. An emergent computer
system can make connections based on experience: It is "nondeterministic," "spontaneous," and
"nonprogrammed." TURKLE, supra note 28, at 133.
Emergent properties are often used to distinguish complex systems from
applications that are merely complicated. They can be thought of as
unexpected behaviors that stem from interaction between the components
of an application and the environment.... [H]owever, there is considerable
disagreement about the nature of 'emergent properties.' Some include
almost any unexpected properties exhibited by a complex system. Others
refer to emergent properties when an application exhibits behaviors that
cannot be identified through functional decomposition. In other words, the
system is more than the sum of its component parts.
CHRISTOPHER W. JOHNSON, WHAT ARE EMERGENT PROPERTIES AND How Do THEY AFFECT THE
ENGINEERING
OF
COMPLEX
SYSTEMS?,
(2006),

http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/-johnson/papers/emergence.pdf
(internal citation omitted).

[https://perma.cc/JBJ6-2Q8T]

313. E.g., DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Lorne Falkenstein

ed., 2011) (1748).
314. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,77 CORNELL L. REV. 254 (1992); e.g.,
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev.

ed. 1989).
315. Thus, for example, G. Edward White wrote about Emerson and the self-fulfillment
rationale: "Emerson was no less enlisted in the premises of modernist jurisprudence than Chafee
or Meiklejohn.... Emerson gave an overview of the 'main premises' of a 'system of freedom of
expression in a democratic society' that amounted to a textbook summary of modernist
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Bauman and Rein Raud emphasize, our life in the digital age has "enabled
us to formulate the basic questions about selfhood much more accurately
and precisely than has previously been possible."31 6 I introduced this
section with the question: If the self is relational and socially constructed,
if the traditional public-private dichotomy has collapsed, then why is the
constitutional protection of free expression significant? As it turns out,
that question is misleading, although it is the traditional (modernist)
question asked by free-speech theorists such as Chafee (search-for-truth),
Meiklejohn (self-governance), and Emerson (self-fulfillment). 3 17 The more
illuminating question is not why, but how: How can we promote free
expression if the self is relational and socially constructed?31 8 The answer
is that we must cultivate and protect social relationships that foster
relational autonomy. Without such relationships, without relational
autonomy, free expression cannot exist.
Significantly, robust constitutional protection of free expression
becomes part of the societal culture that constructs the emergent self. As
such, constitutional protection can shape both the emergent self and the
surrounding society. At the societal level, free expression functions "as a
sort of social Rorschach test." 3 19 By protecting free expression, American
society can commit to creating and protecting the sociocultural space
needed to facilitate relational (individual) autonomy.3 2 0 Free expression

This
can help Americans build and maintain an open society.
constitutional commitment also has ramifications for individual emergent
selves precisely because the society commits to the creation and

epistemology." White, supra note 100, at 354-55.
316. BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 4, at 138.
317. See supra Part II (discussing the development of the three primary philosophical
rationales). As Erwin Chemerinsky writes, there "is a voluminous literature debating why
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
freedom of speech should be regarded as a fundamental right."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 969 (5th ed. 2015). Sometimes, the question of
"why" has been formulated as a question of function. For example, Emerson asked "what it is
that the first amendment attempts to maintain: the function of freedom of expression in a
democratic society." Toward, supra note 100, at 878.
318. In explaining autonomy more broadly (not only with regard to free expression),
Nedelsky writes: "The central question then for inquiries into autonomy (legal or otherwise) is
how to structure relationships so that they foster rather than undermine autonomy." NEDELSKY,
supra note 38, at 98.
319. COHEN, CONFIGURING, supra note 24, at 149.
320. The robust constitutional protection of free expression can manifest "a culture's
normative, collective commitments regarding the scope of movement, both literal and
metaphorical, accorded to its members." Id.
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protection of relational autonomy. 32 1 Quite simply, an individual is more
likely to be autonomous in a society committed to free expression. In turn,
an autonomous emergent self can cultivate empowering social
relationships, experiment with and recreate its own relational self, and
also challenge or accept particular societal norms. 3 2 2 In short, free
expression allows the emergent self to participate autonomously in its own
social construction as well as the construction of the society and culture.
The intertwined concepts of relational autonomy and free expression
underscore that the process of self-emergence is a type of political
struggle. 323 The emergent self's struggle to participate autonomously in its
own social construction manifests a continual "negotiation over what it
means to be human." 324 Simultaneously, the politics of the emergent self
reflects and influences "the very foundations of social life and everyday
living." 3 25 In this context, it is important not to romanticize resistance
against widely held social and cultural norms. As explained, robust free
expression allows the emergent self to question, challenge, or accept
particular norms.326 Acceptance of norms arises in part because of the
force of the norms themselves, the pressure to conform to the mainstream.
But resistance to or challenging of norms does not connote liberation from
sociocultural context. Rather, resistance itself arises from the interaction
of the emergent self with the preexisting social and cultural norms as well
as with other selves. 327 To be sure, resistance often is more difficult than

321. Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1905.
322. "[T]he person's agency is manifested in her appropriating, resisting or reworking
societal discourses, in negotiating material conditions, and in co-constructing the subject
positions she inhabits." Rachel Joffe Falmagne, On the Constitution of 'Self and 'Mind': The
Dialectic ofthe System and the Person, 14 THEORY &PSYCHOLOGY 822, 840 (2004). Free expression
can help the emergent self avoid "the seamless imposition of patterns predetermined by others."
COHEN, CONFIGURING, supra note 24, at 150.
323. Willett et al., supra note 169 (emphasizing that questions of the self are always
political).
324. CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 332. Kwame Anthony Appiah explains:
[B]ecause we are human beings, we are frail, and we are formed; it is our
nature to shape our natures.... Soul making is a part of politics, if not in that
Platonic sense wherein it is the purpose of politics, then at least in the sense
that political decisions must take into account the effects they have on the
character of citizens. And so it would be pointless to praise or dispraise soul
making in itself, to characterize it as an ally or adversary of individuality ....
KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 211 (2005).
325. CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 332.
326. Id. at 332-33.
327. Id. at 332.
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acceptance, but resistance can bring its own unique set of rewards for the
emergent self. Especially in the American context, resistance can feed the
ethos of rugged individualism, which itself is a widely held norm. Put in
different words, in a culturally saturated world, sometimes it is difficult to
disentangle resistance from acceptance of mainstream norms.328 All of
which means, again, that relational autonomy is always a matter of degree.
B. Implications of the Self-Emergence Rationale
1. In General
The self-emergence rationale for free expression engenders an
expansive interpretation of the First Amendment. The rationale protects
expression that fosters the ongoing creative and dynamic process of selfemergence. As such, the rationale encompasses expression that either
directly protects or indirectly facilitates self-emergence. Direct protection
of self-emergence would include expression concerned with the emergent
selfs autonomous participation in its own social construction. Indirect
facilitation would include expression that creates or preserves
sociocultural space for the self to emerge-that is, expression that
engenders relationships promoting autonomy. Thus, the rationale justifies
protecting expression concerned with the emergent selfs struggle to
define either itself or the broader culture and society in which the self
emerges. 329
Expression directly concerned with self-emergence encompasses
much of what individuals might wish to say or write. For instance, if I were
to write a poem or a novel, such writings would be part of my own social
construction. The same would be true if I painted a picture or published a
photograph. Expression facilitating the creation or preservation of
sociocultural space would include much of what we consider to be political
speech. Thus, for example, if I advocated in favor of a higher capital gains
tax, such expression would be protected. Or if I argued that college
students should be taught more about both creative and expository
writing, then I would be attempting to create sociocultural space for the
self-emergence of others. But expression that opens sociocultural space
328. See Cohen, Privacy, supra note 24, at 1918-19 (discussing innovation).
329. My notion of an emergent self resonates with James Grimmelmann's emphasis on the
active listener. James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868 (2014) [hereinafter
Engines]; cf Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1015 (2015)
(arguing free speech entails consideration of how a restriction affects an individual's sense of
identity and personal aims as well as the relevant community's collective life).
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might not be patently political (though it is always political, at least
latently). For example, the contrast between generative and sterile digital
environments, discussed earlier, illustrates the difference between the
opening and closing of sociocultural spaces.33 0 If, on the one hand, an
individual were to write computer code that created generative Internet
architecture, then the writing of that code would be opening sociocultural
space for emergent selves. Generative digital architecture, by definition,
facilitates individual innovation and social interaction. 331 Therefore, the
writing or creating of such digital architecture would be protected
expression under the self-emergence rationale. If, on the other hand, an
individual were to write code that sterilized Internet architecture, that
narrowed or destroyed the generative environment, such expression
would not be creating or preserving sociocultural space for emergent
selves. Sterile architecture tends to limit individuals and discourages
creativity and interaction. Such code writing or expression, consequently,
should not be protected.
More generally, expression that neither protects nor facilitates selfemergence would be constitutionally unprotected. For instance, speech
directly impeding the self-emergence of others would be unprotected.
Thus, expression that manipulates, deceives, or coerces others falls outside
of First-Amendment protection. 332 Because the self-emergence rationale
emphasizes creating sociocultural space for the creative and dynamic
development of individual emergent selves, expression that distorts or
limits the space of listeners does not deserve protection. Hence, for
example, hate speech directed at denying the humanity of certain societal
groups would fall into this unprotected category.333 Hate speech would

limit the victims' sociocultural space for autonomous self-creation and
self-determination. 334
Speech constituting true threats would also be unprotected. Elonis v.
United States, decided in 2015, raised a true-threats issue: Must the
prosecution prove that the defendant subjectively intended to

330. ZITTRAIN, FUTURE, supra note 231, at 2-4, 70-74.
331. Id. at 70-71.
332. See Allen, supra note 35, at 96-122 (discussing Habermas's notion of distorted
subjectivity).
333. See Stephen M. Feldman, Hate Speech and Democracy, 32 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 78 (2013)
(reviewing JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012)) (discussing the constitutional
protection of hate speech).
334. See Brison, supra note 297, at 286-93 (arguing that hate speech is unprotected
because it undermines autonomy).
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communicate a true threat, or could the prosecution merely prove that the
defendant's speech would threaten a reasonable person?335 This issue was
raised under both the First Amendment and the true-threats statute. 336
The defendant in Elonis had posted threats against his former wife on
Facebook. The defendant claimed, however, that he had not subjectively
intended to threaten his former wife, regardless of whether a reasonable
person in his wife's position might have found the Facebook posts
threatening.33 7 According to the defendant, he was merely echoing the
lines of rap artists for self-therapeutic purposes.338 The Court held that the
criminal statute required proof of subjective intent and therefore did not
reach the constitutional issue.339
If a court were to decide the First-Amendment issue in the future, the
self-emergence rationale suggests that a reasonable-person rather than a
subjective standard would be appropriate.3 4 0 If the facts resembled those
of Elonis, the defendant undoubtedly would argue that his self-emergence
required that he be allowed to express himself as a rapper. 34 1 And to be
sure, the defendant should be allowed to fume about his ex-wife to other
individuals, such as his friends at a bar. But the reach of his protected
expression must end where it would impede the self-emergence of others,
such as those who would reasonably be threatened. When the defendant
posted the threats online through Facebook, then the expression could
reasonably threaten the self-emergence of the targeted individual. Indeed,
this case nicely illustrates the important ramifications of relational
autonomy for free expression. The crux of the problem is a relationship:
namely, the relationship between the former husband and wife. It is
precisely the nature of that relationship that can expand or diminish the
former wife's autonomy. A woman who reasonably fears attack will
necessarily experience a diminished sense of autonomy-a diminished
capacity to make choices and take actions in her ongoing process of self-

335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Elonis, 135 S. CL 2001 (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011-12.
Id. at 2004-07.
Id. at 2012.
For discussions of true threats as a constitutional issue, see the following: Virginia v.

Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First
Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (2006); Jennifer Elrod, Expressive Activity, True
Threats, and the FirstAmendment, 36 CONN. L. REV. 541 (2004).
341. See Elonis, 135 S. CL at 2004-07.
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emergence. 342
False speech presents an interesting problem underscoring that
relational autonomy is always a matter of degree. In United States v.
Alvarez, the defendant lied about receiving the Congressional Medal of
Honor when he attended his first public meeting as a member of a water
board. 343 As the Court phrased it, his lying was "a pathetic attempt to gain
respect." 3 4 4 The defendant was prosecuted under the Stolen Valor Act of

2005, but the Court held that the First Amendment protected the speech.34 5
In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that the expression did
not fall into a previously recognized unprotected (or low-value) category
of free speech such as obscenity or fighting words. 346 In particular, the
defendant's lies did not constitute defamation or any other low-value
category involving falsehoods. 347 Kennedy refused to recognize a new lowvalue category for lies, in general, and thus instead applied strict scrutiny,
which requires the government to show that the restriction is narrowly
tailored (or necessary) to achieve a compelling purpose. 348 Predictably,
the government could not satisfy that rigorous standard; the speech was
constitutionally protected. 349
Under the self-emergence rationale, however, lying should sometimes
be outside First-Amendment guarantees.3 5 When such lying is likely to
mislead others, potentially affecting their attitudes and actions in a way
that diminishes or distorts their sociocultural space, then the lie should be
unprotected. In such circumstances, which would include the Alvarez
situation, the lie is likely to interfere with the self-emergence of other
people. But in other circumstances, a lie might be constitutionally
protected. If the lie is unlikely to detrimentally affect others or, more
important, is likely to provide benefit to others, then constitutional
342. FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 140-59 (explaining how domestic abuse diminishes
relational autonomy); see Baker, Autonomy, supra note 170, at 255-56 (arguing from perspective
of self-fulfillment rationale that true threats should not be protected).
343. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
344. Id. at 2542.
345. Id. at 2551. Stolen Valor Act of 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012).
346. 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
347. Id. at 2544-46; see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (articulating an
actual malice standard for certain defamation actions).
348. 132 S. Ct. at 2548.
349. Id. at 2549.
350. For a subtle treatment of lying and free expression, from the perspective of the
traditional rationales, see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the
FirstAmendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435 (2015).
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protection would be appropriate. For example, if a reporter lies about her
identity to gain access to a factory operating illegally-suppose it is an
unclean meatpacking plant-the reporter's lie might have significant
public benefit.3 5 The lie might alleviate a public health danger. Ultimately,
because relational autonomy is a matter of degree, a court would need to
evaluate a case of lying by weighing the potential benefits and detriments
to sociocultural space and self-emergence. Presumably, in many instances,
the lie might benefit the speaker (until the fact of the lie is divulged), but
that benefit alone cannot be the end of the analysis. A court would need to
consider the consequences for other people. The speaker's purposes
would be an important but not necessarily determinative factor in
ascertaining such consequences. 352
2. Free Expression and Publicly Held Business Corporations
The self-emergence rationale has enormous ramifications in the digital
age. As discussed, MNCs manipulate and control much of the informationflow on the Internet. These business corporations (as well as other
corporations) often invoke the First Amendment to protect their
activities.35 3 The Roberts Court, to this point, has strongly favored
corporate legal claims, whether constitutional or otherwise. 354 The Court's
most important recent decision protecting corporations is, perhaps,
Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission.355 Citizens United, it should
be mentioned, was a nonprofit corporation, but the Supreme Court
generally has not distinguished among types of corporations for
constitutional purposes.3 56
During the Rehnquist Court years, the Court had vacillated over the

&

351. See id. at 1454-71 (explaining a concept of high value lies).
352. To be clear, a lack of constitutional protection does not necessarily mean that the
government should criminally proscribe lying in general, but rather that the First Amendment
should not prohibit the government from doing so. In this instance, the government claimed that
it had a compelling interest in upholding "the integrity of the military honors system in general,
and the Congressional Medal of Honor in particular." Alvarez, 132 S. CL at 2548.
353. Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie FirstAmendment, 56 WM.& MARY L. REV. 1119, 1125, 114041 (2015).
354. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (holding that Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure protected corporation from class-action claim); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (holding that a discrimination claim against Goodyear was timebarred); see Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, supra note 353, at 1120 (arguing that the
Court's free-speech doctrine is in the service of economic power).
355. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
356. Id. at 319.
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degree to which the government could regulate corporate spending on
political campaigns, but Citizens United ended the uncertainty.3 57 Citizens
United invalidated provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002, which maintained limits on corporate spending for political
campaign advertisements.35 8 The majority opinion began by articulating
two first-amendment premises. First, the Court reiterated the maxim,
initially stated in Buckley v. Valeo,3 59 that spending on political campaigns
constitutes speech. 360 Second, the Court emphasized that, as stated in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,36 1 free-speech protections extend to

corporations. 362 With these premises in hand, the Court could focus on the
crux of its reasoning: the self-governance rationale for free expression.
"Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy," Kennedy wrote.363 "The
right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to
reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a
necessary means to protect it."364 Under the First Amendment, in other
words, free expression is a constitutional lodestar in American democracy
and must be vigorously protected. Moreover, corporate expenditures on
political campaigns, from the Court's perspective, go the core of the First
Amendment. 365 Restrictions on such political speech and writing destroy
"'liberty"' and are necessarily unconstitutional, 366 unless the government
can satisfy strict scrutiny by showing that the regulation is necessary to
achieve a compelling purpose. 367
The Court acknowledged that the prevention of corruption constituted
a compelling government purpose, but then so severely narrowed the
definition of corruption that any evidence (of corruption) was rendered
practically irrelevant. Only a direct contribution to a candidate or
officeholder can constitute corruption or its appearance, according to the

357. Id.
358. Id. at 321.
359. 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
360. 558 U.S. at 336-41.
361. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
362. 558 U.S. at 340-42.
363. Id. at 339.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 343.
366. Id. at 354 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 130 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961)).
367. Id. at 340.
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Citizens United Court. 368 An independent expenditure, even on behalf of a
specific candidate or officeholder, cannot do so. 36 9 In other words,
anything short of a bribe or the appearance of a bribe is permissible.3 70
Given this narrow view of corruption, the Court concluded that the
government could not satisfy strict scrutiny.3 7 ' The Court reinforced its
conclusion by invoking another of the traditional philosophical rationales,
the search-for-truth. 372 Restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures,
the Court reasoned, interfere "with the 'open marketplace' of ideas
protected by the First Amendment."37 3 Ultimately, in Citizens United and
its progeny, the Roberts Court proclaimed that corporations and other
wealthy entities and individuals can spend unlimited sums in their efforts
to determine elections and government policies. 374
As Citizens United illustrates, the Roberts Court justices rely on the
traditional rationales to protect corporate spending as expression.37 5 But
the traditional rationales, based on the classical liberal self, are inapt in the
digital age. Meanwhile, the self-emergence rationale strongly suggests that
publicly held business corporations should not have free-expression rights
under the First Amendment for two reasons. First, the rationale protects
expression related to the emergent self's autonomous participation in its
own social construction, but a business corporation does not have a
creative and dynamic emerging self. To the contrary, to the degree that a
corporation has a nature or personality at all, it is predetermined and
static: to pursue profit. The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA)
allows a corporation to engage "in any lawful business," 376 but ultimately,
Thus, a
the word, corporation, means "corporation for profit."3 77
368. Id. at 356-57.
369. Id.
370. The Court reiterated this crucial point in McCutcheon v. FEC. 134 S. Ct 1434, 1441
(2014).
371. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357-65.
372. Id. at 355, 372.
373. Id. at 354 (quoting New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008)).
374. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v.
Bullock, 567 U.S. 516 (2012) (per curiam); Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
375. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment); New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008).
376. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (MBCA)

§

3.01(a) (CORP. LAWS COMM. 2010).

377. Id. § 1.40(4). Many states have followed the MBCA in crafting their state incorporation
&

statutes. ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 18-19 (4th ed. 1996); HARRY G. HENN
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 8 (3d ed. 1983).
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corporation's values and goals do not evolve over time in reaction to its
sociocultural context.
A corporation is created to profit, and it
indefatigably pursues profit throughout its existence.37 8 Of course, a
corporation can change-for instance, it might introduce a new product to
sell-but the corporation changes only in its quest to better satisfy its
preexisting and fixed goal: profit.
Second, the self-emergence rationale protects expression that creates
or preserves sociocultural space fostering autonomy.
A business
corporation neither creates nor preserves such space. Instead, business
corporations attempt to manipulate, narrow, or distort sociocultural
spaces. A business corporation, in its resolute pursuit of profits,
strategically attempts to channel preexisting preferences or to mold new
desires so that individuals use or purchase the corporate products or
services.3 79 A business corporation does not want to create or preserve the
opportunity for individual autonomous choice-unless that choice is to
buy. As Peter Drucker emphasized, the only valid purpose for a business
is "to create a customer."38 0 Consider commercial advertisements.
Whether the advertisement is an unsophisticated and direct urge to buy a
product or a complex and subtle association of a product with an attractive
lifestyle, the business corporation that pays for the advertisement always
has the same goal. The corporation does not care whether the individual
viewer enjoys an amusing or exciting lifestyle or autonomously chooses
what is truly in the viewer's best interest. The corporation cares only
whether the advertisement successfully induces the viewer to become a
purchaser or other source of corporate revenue. 381 A viewer's decision to
purchase the product might even generate bad (or disastrous)
consequences for that particular individual. Maybe, the individual buys a
car instead of investing in higher education, which would lead to a more
rewarding job. Or maybe, the individual buys a plane ticket to Las Vegas
even though he or she suffers from a gambling addiction. It is all the same

378. See ROBERT L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT 10 (2008) (emphasizing
that "the profit imperative is ... a fundamental obligation of the corporate charter"); TAMARA R.
PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRSTAMENDMENT 148-52 (2012) (emphasizing corporate profit motive).
379. See BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 4, at 110-15 (emphasizing that corporate marketing
seeks to shape desires for profit); SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 5-6 (emphasizing corporate
processing and analysis of data for profit).
380. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 37 (HarperCollins 2006) (emphasis
omitted).
381. See PIETY, supra note 378, at 31-32 (emphasizing commercial expression as aiming for
profit).
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to the business corporation. All is well so long as it accrues profits. In
short, a business corporation seeks to manipulate individuals and distort
sociocultural space for the corporation's benefit-profits. 382
Like the business corporation, the classical liberal self is an entity or
being that (supposedly) has a preexisting nature, with goals that exist
regardless of sociocultural context. Maybe for this reason, the Roberts
Court can readily conceptualize corporations as selves deserving of freespeech rights. The corporate entity, at least to a degree, resembles the
classical liberal self. Indeed, a business corporation is like homo
economicus writ large (an MNC is homo economicus on steroids). Homo
economicus is an economic self that seeks only to maximize the
satisfaction of its own (economic) interests. 383 Contrary to feminist theory,

"[e]conomic man ... has neither a childhood nor a context. He grows out
of the ground like a mushroom." 384 As such, homo economicus, first
developed by neoclassical economists, can be understood as an extreme
form of the classical liberal self.385 And because the corporate personality

resonates with the classical liberal self, the Court can reason that
corporations, like classical liberal selves, must enjoy first-amendment
386
protection pursuant to the traditional philosophical rationales.
382. See SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 54-56 (emphasizing that the Internet manipulates
users). Habermas emphasizes how strategic actions, appropriate in the economic sphere, can
coerce and distort communication in the (symbolic) lifeworld. HABERMAS, 2 THEORY, supra note
214, at 150-52; HABERMAS, 1 THEORY, supra note 214, at 340-43; Jurgen Habermas, The
Hermeneutic Claim to Universality (1971), reprinted in JOSEF BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY
HERMENEUTICS 181, 205 (1980); see JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS

TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322-23 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (explaining

validity claims in communication).
383. "The neoclassical economists' Homo Economicus has several characteristics, the most
important of which are (1) maximizing (optimizing) behavior; (2) the cognitive ability to
exercise rational choice; and (3) individualistic behavior and independent tastes and
preferences." Chris Doucouliagos, A Note on the Evolution ofHomo Economicus, 28 J. ECON. ISSUES
877, 877 (1994); see Christine jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471 (1998) (discussing and criticizing concept of homo economicus); Tanina Rostain,
Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics
Movement, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 973 (2000) (same).
384. KATRINE MAR AL, WHO COOKED ADAM SMITH'S DINNER? A STORY ABOUT WOMEN AND
ECONOMICS 61 (Saskia Vogel trans., 2016).

385. The prototypical classical economist, Adam Smith, can also be understood to be a
proponent of the classical liberal self. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); see ALBERT 0.
HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 100-13 (20th Anniversary ed., 1997) (discussing
Smith's varied depictions of human nature); Stephen Holmes, The Secret History of Self-Interest,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 267, 267-83 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing Smith's
conceptualization of the self).
386. In fact, the Roberts Court occasionally characterizes the citizen-self as if it were homo
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But the repudiation of the traditional rationales and their replacement
with the self-emergence rationale reveal the weakness of the Court's
constitutional protection of corporations. An entity, such as a corporation,
that neither protects nor facilitates self-emergence does not have any freeexpression rights under the self-emergence rationale. A corporate
relationship to a customer is not mutual and reciprocal. The corporation
manipulates the customer for its own profit. To be sure, the customer
might garner benefit from the interaction, but such benefit is incidental to
the corporation-unless customer benefit will produce additional
corporate profits. If a caring and nurturing relationship is a prototype for
creating autonomous space, then the corporate-customer relationship is
an archetype for destroying space. As feminists have emphasized, the
economic marketplace undervalues caring and nurturing interactions.38 7
Such relationships are either unpaid or low paid and are often denigrated
as unproductive.38 8
Given this, a First-Amendment jurisprudence
grounded on relational autonomy would not extend free-expression rights
to business corporations (because corporations seek to destroy
autonomous space). Unsurprisingly, then, the pro-business Roberts
Court's First-Amendment decisions overvalue the economic marketplace
to the detriment of individual (relational) autonomy.
To underscore the contrast between the traditional rationales and the
self-emergence rationale, notice that we could reasonably discuss the selffulfillment of a corporation. A corporation has a preexisting goal, to profit,
and hence the accrual of profits would fulfill or realize that goal. The selfemergence rationale, however, is not the same as the self-fulfillment
rationale. The self-fulfillment rationale assumed the self (the classical
liberal self) to be a being with a preexisting nature. Free expression, then,
was necessary to allow the self to fulfill or realize its nature. But this
conception of the self is patently inapt in the digital age.3 89

economicus. In Citizens United, the Court stated: "The censorship we now confront is vast in its
reach. The Government has 'muffle[d] the voices that best represent the most significant
segments of the economy."' 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,
540 U.S. 93, 257-58 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
dissenting in part)) (emphasis added). From this perspective, "segments of the economy" are
speakers with protected constitutional rights. Id.
387. MAR(AL, supra note 384, at 16-17, 30, 59.
388. See id. at 32-36 (emphasizing that even when economists accounted for caregiving
and similar work, they concluded that women deserved less pay than men).
389. Significantly, even though a business corporation should not enjoy free-expression
rights, each officer of (or other participant in) the organization should still enjoy his or her own
individual rights.
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If anything, in the digital age, we should not be stuck discussing
whether publicly held business corporations have free-expression rights.
Instead, we should recognize that MNCs threaten the sociocultural spaces
of individual emergent selves. Ordinary people, in other words, have much
to fear from business corporations. The collapse of the traditional publicprivate dichotomy underscores the degree to which MNCs control and
manipulate individuals. MNCs have constructed Internet architectures
that facilitate their power to gather information about individuals, control
the expression of individuals, and direct individuals to choices
commensurate with corporate goals. 390 And of course, the corporate goals,
in the end, are always the same: profit. Internet corporations work to
produce (and reproduce) socially constructed selves that willingly, even
joyously, feed the corporate coffers.391 In the political struggle over selfemergence, business corporations do not want to create space for
autonomous individuals to emerge or to resist predominant cultural
norms. Rather, corporations want to mold selves not only to accept but to
fervently execute their roles as consumers. With the power of Internet
architecture (and other resources) at their disposal, corporations wield
enormous political strength and thus are highly successful in this
endeavor.392 Indeed, many individuals seem to believe that they express
their freedom and individuality by choosing to purchase particular
products, which are marketed to fulfill that very purpose. 393 Think of
Apple and its basket full of "I" products: iPhones, iPads, iPods, and iMacs.
As the Apple commercials with Justin Long ("Hello, I'm a Mac") and John
Hodgman ("And I'm a PC") suggested, Apple products are for special
people (like me, or "I").394
390. See SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 1-7, 33-34, 47-49 (emphasizing how Internet
corporations pursue profit); Wu, supra note 8, at 273 (emphasizing how a handful of
corporations "disproportionately determine what the Internet is in the 2010s").
391. Corporations have been attempting to shape individual preferences since long before
the digital age. See GARY CROSS, AN ALL-CONSUMING CENTURY: WHY COMMERCIALISM WON IN MODERN

AMERICA (2000) (emphasizing the turn to consumerism in twentieth century); CUSHMAN, supra
note 4, at 6-7 (discussing post-World War II consumerism); STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS (1976) (explaining how capitalists sought to transform workers into consumers
in the early-twentieth century).
392. See SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 78-79; see Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 440-41
(emphasizing that commodification or propertization threaten free expression in the digital age).
393. See Strahilevitz, supra note 261, at 2023.
394. See id. (discussing Apple marketing). One might wonder whether Grimmelmann's
emphasis on the active listener would lead to a contrary conclusion: that corporate speech
should be protected if the listener (or Internet user) would benefit. See Engines, supra note 329
(emphasizing active listeners). Even so, I would argue that an emphasis on the listener should
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In an ideal (rather than an iDeal) world, we would be discussing
whether individuals can invoke their free-expression rights against
publicly held business corporations that unduly limit the spaces of our
emergent selves. But in our present situation, any constitutional challenge
to corporate control over Internet expression would likely be deflected by
the state-action doctrine: The constitutional limitations of the First
Amendment do not apply because corporations are not traditional state
actors.3 95 Significantly, the state-action doctrine itself resonates with the
classical liberal self. The state-action doctrine implies that constitutional
limits need apply only to government actors. 39 6 The absence of
government action supposedly equates with individual liberty.39 7 In our
digital age, though, we need to acknowledge that the lingering appeal of
the classical liberal self subtly bolsters corporate power over our emergent
selves. The rhetoric of the classical liberal self socially constructs us to be
(and want to be) classical liberal selves (and happy active consumers)-to
believe that the absence of government maximizes individual liberty. 398
Hence, many individuals vigorously oppose and denounce government
actions, including government regulations of the Internet.39 9 But in the
digital age, corporate power is as much a threat to individuals as is
government power, if not more so. 4 0 0 In a democracy, however imperfect
it might be, the people at least have some opportunity to affect the
government's goals. With a business corporation, people have only one
choice: to buy or not to buy. The goal is clear: corporate profit.4 0 1
also account for how business corporations might try to manipulate listeners for corporate
profit.
395. E.g., Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10-CV-03579-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 4269304 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2010) (dismissing claim against Facebook because of lack of state action); see Tushnet,
supra note 272, at 2253-58 (discussing state-action problems). The self-emergence rationale
might justify constitutional attacks on statutes, such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 (DMCA), which otherwise insulate business corporations from liability. Pub. L. No. 105304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877; see PASQUALE, supra note 249, at 93-94 (discussing DMCA). In other
words, if a statute shields a corporation that is infringing on free expression, as understood
pursuant to the self-emergence rationale, then the statute might be open to constitutional
challenge. See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (Google invoked DMCA
safe harbor provision as protecting it from liability for copyright infringement).
396. See Tushnet, supra note 272, at 2253-54.
397. See HAYEK, supra note 216, at 17; STEDMAN JONES, supra note 217, at 2.
398. See HAYEK, supranote 216, at 80-81.
399. See Tushnet, supra note 272, at 2255-57.
400. See SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 78-87 (emphasizing a public-private partnership in
digital surveillance).
401. See CUSHMAN, supra note 4, at 20 (arguing that concept of the classical liberal self
reinforces existing power relations); NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND
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Since individuals are unlikely to be able to bring successful
constitutional challenges against publicly held business corporations,
402
legislation or agency action regulating corporations might be necessary.
In other words, in the digital age, we might need government regulations
of Internet corporate activities to preserve individual liberty, to clear space
for our selves to emerge. It is worth reiterating that both government and
private entities, especially large corporations, can limit expression in the
digital age-hence, the self-emergence rationale justifies protecting
against both public and private suppression-yet appropriate government
regulation of Internet corporations can also enhance freedom of
expression. In any event, legislating in this area would face numerous
obstacles. At a practical level, federal action would be more effective than
state legislation because the threat to individual liberty is a national rather
than a local problem (in fact, it is more of a global than a national problem).
Yet, over the past few years, Congress has not demonstrated an ability to
403
respond expeditiously to most needs or problems, to say the least.
Moreover, Internet-related MNCs are likely to lobby strenuously in
opposition to any efforts at regulation, whether in Congress, state
legislatures, or administrative agencies. But even if legislative or agency
action were possible, we would then circle back to the prospect of
corporate claims to first-amendment protections. 404
Potentially significant Internet-related issues involving business
corporations loom on the horizon. For instance, is computer source code
speech and therefore protected under the First Amendment? 405 Or is data,
in general, speech and therefore protected under the First Amendment? 406
GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 26-27, 45 (1989) (arguing that the classical liberal
framework masks the operation of power and domination).
402. One possible way to sidestep the first-amendment arguments of ISPs, at least, is to
categorize ISPs as common carriers. Whether this argument will work remains unclear.
Crawford, supra note 13, at 2365-73; see Wu, supra note 8, at 57-58, 311-12 (discussing doctrine
of common carriers); Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 428-29 (discussing common carriers and
net neutrality).
403. Drew Desilver, Congress Ends Least-Productive Year in Recent History, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/12/23/congress-endsleast-productive-year-in-recent-history/ [https://perma.cc/NG2K-2ZUH].
404. To be clear, the government should not necessarily suppress all corporate expression
The
merely because corporations should not enjoy First-Amendment protections.
determination of free-expression rights is distinct from the issue of whether to suppress
particular speech or writing.
405. See, e.g., Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999), reh'g
granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that source code is speech).
406. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57 (2014) (arguing that data is
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Or more particularly, does the First Amendment protect search-engine
results? 40 7 One of the most important issues is net neutrality. One way for

ISPs, including MNCs Verizon, Comcast, and AT&T, to increase profits is by
discriminating among their customers. 408 If allowed, ISPs can create fast
and slow lanes of Internet access. 409 The ISPs then would discriminate
among customers based on willingness to pay for faster service.
Customers unwilling (or unable) to pay a premium would be relegated to
the slow lane of Internet access. Customers paying the premium would
slide into the fast lane. Corporate customers, such as Netflix, which rely on
ISPs to provide access to their end users, would effectively be forced to pay
for fast-lane access. 4 1 0 On February 26, 2015, the FCC adopted new rules
mandating net neutrality, thus requiring ISPs to provide all customers with
equal service. 411 Under these rules, ISPs are not allowed to discriminate
based on willingness to pay a premium. ISPs and related trade
organizations sued the FCC, challenging the rules on multiple grounds. 412
One issue is whether net neutrality violates the ISPs' first-amendment
rights to free expression. They argue, in effect, that they have a right to
control their networks. 4 13
The Roberts Court, to date, has decided only two cases explicitly
involving digital information. 4 14 In both cases, the Court reached the pro-

speech).
407. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003) (holding Google's search rankings were protected speech); see Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013) (arguing that algorithms are
speech); Oren Bracha, The Folklore of Informationalism:The Case of Search Engine Speech, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2014) (arguing that search engine results are not speech).
408. Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 428-29 (discussing net neutrality).
409. Id.
410. See WU, supra note 8, at 260, 286-87 (discussing net neutrality); Balkin, Future, supra
note 39, at 428-29 (same).
411. Federal
Communications
Commission,
Open
Internet,
https://www.fcc.gov/general/open-internet [https://perma.cc/485W-696D].
412. E.g., State of Tennessee v. FCC, Nos. 15-3291/15-3555 (6th Cir. May 21, 2015); U.S.
Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 23, 2015); see U.S. Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 825
F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding, pursuant to statutory interpretation and administrative law,
that FCC can define high-speed Internet service as a utility, which creates the possibility for
broad regulation).
413. Brodkin, supra note 12; Bode, supra note 12.
414. If one includes Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015), because it involved
Facebook postings, then there are three cases. Discussed above in the text, Elonis involved true
threats, but was decided on statutory grounds. In a limited number of cases, the Rehnquist Court
leaned toward the invalidation of government regulations of the Internet. These cases were
decided at a time, however, when many still viewed the Internet as inherently free and beyond
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business decision. In Brown v. EntertainmentMerchants Association, the
Court invalidated a state law that prohibited "the sale or rental of 'violent
video games' to minors." 415 The Court began by invoking the selfgovernance rationale and explaining that, at its core, the First Amendment
protects "discourse on public matters." 416 Nevertheless, the Court added
that "we have long recognized that it is difficult to distinguish politics from
entertainment, and dangerous to try."417 Hence, effectively piggy-backing
on the self-governance rationale, the Court granted full first-amendment
protection to video games in general. "Like the protected books, plays, and
movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas-and even
social messages-through many familiar literary devices (such as
characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to
the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world)." 4 1 8
Video games, therefore, are presumptively protected unless the expressive
content of the game falls into a previously recognized low-value category
of expression. But even violent video games, the Court found, are not
within a low-value category. 419 Moreover, the state failed to demonstrate
that a new low-value category should be recognized. 420 Thus, the only way
the government could justify this statutory restriction was by satisfying
the strict scrutiny standard. 421 While protecting children from portrayals
of violence might be a compelling state interest, the Court concluded that
the regulation in this case was not narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 42 2
The regulation of video games was, for instance, underinclusive because it
still allowed children to be exposed to depictions of violence in sources
other than video games. 423

control. Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (invalidating federal
statutory provisions that criminalized the transmission of obscene or indecent materials
possibly accessible by minors); Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(invalidating federal statute protecting children from online material of prurient interest
because not the least restrictive means); see United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539
U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion) (upholding requirement for libraries to install filtering
software if libraries accepted federal funding for Internet access).
415. 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011).
416. Id. at 790.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 792.
420. Id. at 792-93.
421. Id. at 799.
422. Id. at 804.
423. Id. at 799-804.
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Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., involved the gathering and business-use of
medical data, which is now a widespread enterprise-and merely one
example of the ubiquitous and highly profitable data mining.4 24 When
pharmacies process prescriptions, they routinely record information such
as the prescribing doctor, the patient, the dosage, and so forth.425 Data
mining businesses, like IMS Health Inc., buy this information, analyze it,
and sell or lease their reports to pharmaceutical manufacturers. 426 When
armed with this information, pharmaceutical salespersons are able to
market their drugs more effectively to doctors.427 Vermont enacted a law
to prevent pharmacies from selling this information. 428 The legislature had
two primary purposes: first, to protect the privacy of patients and doctors,
and second, to improve public health by, for example, encouraging doctors
to prescribe drugs in their patients' best interests rather than because of
effective pharmaceutical marketing. 429 Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent,
joined by two other justices, characterized the statute as a police power
regulation of the economic marketplace that did not trigger free-speech
concerns. 430 The Court's conservative majority disagreed.4 31 It viewed the
statute as raising an unusual commercial speech issue. 432 Commercial
speech cases typically involve advertising, and as the Court admitted, the
statute in Sorrell did not restrict advertising per se.4 3 3 Yet, the Court
reasoned that the First Amendment not only applied but also required
"heightened judicial scrutiny," 4 34 a standard more rigorous than the
Central Hudson balancing test ordinarily applied in commercial speech
cases. 435 The Court, in the end, invalidated the statute and thus protected
424. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); see PASQUALE, supra note 249, at 27-30
(discussing medical records); SCHNEIER, supranote 16, at 33-45 (discussing data mining).
425. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 558.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 558-59.
429. Id. at 572.
430. Id. at 591 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In other words, the Court should have concluded
that this case was not within the scope or coverage of the First Amendment at all. The Court,
therefore, should not have been discussing First-Amendment protections. See Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A PreliminaryExploration of Constitutional
Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) (distinguishing First-Amendment coverage from
protection).
431. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 591.
432. Id. at 563-67.
433. Id. at 561-63, 572.
434. Id. at 563.
435. Id. at 563, 583; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
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marketplace activities that were only tenuously connected to expression.
Brown and Sorrell, when combined with the Roberts Court's generally
solicitous attitude toward business corporations, do not bode well for
individual liberty if the Court were to rule on net neutrality or the other
potential Internet-related issues (of course, the nomination and
confirmation of Scalia's replacement might change the political tilt of the
Court). If a corporate ISP, for example, were to challenge a federal net
neutrality requirement, the Court would likely side with the corporation
and invalidate the federal rule. The conservative justices probably would
reason as follows. First, corporations enjoy first-amendment free-speech
rights. Second, free expression is a constitutional lodestar. Third, the
government must therefore satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Finally, the
government cannot satisfy this rigorous judicial standard. Consequently,
corporate ISPs would be able to maximize profits, while their customers
would be forced either to pay a premium or to suffer inferior or limited
Internet access. In such a case, the Court would be complicit (with
corporations) in limiting the free expression of many online users while
ostensibly protecting corporate free expression.
Judicial recognition and application of the self-emergence rationale
would clarify such Internet-related free-expression issues. If an ISP, such
as Verizon, or a search engine corporation, such as Google, were to invoke
the First Amendment and its protections, the result would be unequivocal.
Business corporations should not enjoy First-Amendment protections
because they neither protect nor facilitate self-emergence. Corporations
have fixed natures rather than emerging selves, and they try to close,
narrow, or distort rather than create or preserve sociocultural space for
emergent selves. Thus, the first step in the above argument-that
corporations enjoy First-Amendment free-speech rights-would be
repudiated. 436 When the justices, though, instead invoke the traditional
philosophical rationales, the rationales skew the judicial results-or at
least facilitate the justices' attempts to legitimate the constitutional
protection of corporations. But the foundational assumptions of the
traditional rationales-the classical liberal self and the concomitant
public-private dichotomy-are incongruous with the digital age and can

557, 566 (1980). The Sorrell Court reasoned that it would have invalidated the law even if it had
applied Central Hudson. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571-72. See also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010) (invalidating federal statute prohibiting animal crush videos).
436. Cf Baker, Autonomy, supra note 170, at 272-74 (arguing from perspective of
autonomy or self-fulfillment rationale that commercial speech should not be protected).
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no longer undergird the rationales. Relying on the search-for-truth, selfgovernance, or self-fulfillment rationale would be like relying on the
assumption that the earth is the center of the solar system. It would be a
mistake, and any argument built on that assumption would be
erroneous. 4 37
V.

CONCLUSION

The self-emergence rationale overlaps to a limited degree with the
traditional philosophical rationales. Most obviously, the self-emergence
rationale evokes the self-fulfillment rationale, but there are crucial
differences. The self-fulfillment rationale was built on the classical liberal
self, a being with a preexisting nature. Free expression, from this vantage,
enabled the self to fulfill or realize its nature. The self-emergence rationale
rejects the classical liberal self. Instead, this rationale emphasizes
autonomous self-emergence and the sociocultural space needed for such a
creative and dynamic process. Ultimately, self-emergence is what selffulfillment must become in the digital age.

437. Corporations that qualify as the press would still have First-Amendment rights under
the free press clause. Thus, the ruling in a case such as New York Times v. Sullivan would be
unaffected. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
The Court generally has not distinguished among various types of corporations for
constitutional purposes, but the self-emergence rationale would suggest doing so. To discuss all
types of corporations (including non-profits), alternative business organizations, and other
types of organizations and associations would expand this Article far beyond its intended scope.
The advantage of the Court's indiscriminate granting of free-expression rights to all corporations
is simplicity. That is, the Court's current approach creates a bright line rule. The large
disadvantage of this bright line approach is that it produces untoward conclusions. If courts
instead were to apply the self-emergence rationale, they would necessarily be engaged in more
ad hoc decision making. In each instance, a court would need to ask whether the corporation or
other entity either protects or facilitates self-emergence. For example, the NAACP is a nonprofit
corporation that advocates for civil rights. More precisely, its mission "is to ensure the political,
educational, social, and economic equality of rights of all persons and to eliminate race-based
discrimination."
Our Mission, NAACP (2017), http://www.naacp.org/pages/our-mission
[https://perma.cc/2LGZ-PK89]. Thus, in litigation before the Supreme Court in 1957, the NAACP
explained that it advocated for the "achievement of desired social, economic and political
reforms within the framework of our democratic society." Brief for Petitioner at 4, NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (No. 91, 1957 Term). In effect, the NAACP stated
that it sought to create sociocultural space for emergent selves. The NAACP brief declared that
its members believed that "if the American public became aware of the injustices which Negroes
suffered and the circumscribed lives which they were forced to lead solely because of color
discrimination," id. at 2, then public opinion would demand "social, economic and political
reforms," id at 4. The Court, therefore, has correctly recognized that the NAACP deserves FirstAmendment rights. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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The political element inherent to self-emergence suggests a partial
connection to another traditional rationale: self-governance. 4 8 And, in
fact, Jack Balkin has suggested a possible reformulation of the selfgovernance rationale for the digital age. He focuses this reformulation on
what he calls "democratic culture."4 3 9

Balkin's democratic-culture

rationale is the mirror image of the self-emergence rationale. In other
words, the self-emergence and democratic-culture rationales are
complementary. The self-emergence rationale revolves around the
interaction of society, culture, and the individual in the creative and
dynamic emergence of the self. Balkin's democratic-culture rationale
similarly revolves around the interaction of society, culture, and the
individual, but it emphasizes culture rather than the individual self.4 4 0
When Balkin talks of democratic culture, he is not referring to the culture
that is necessary for or nurturing of democratic government processes per
4 42
"A
se.4 4 1 Rather, he is describing a widely participatory culture.
democratic culture is not democratic because people get to vote on what
culture should be like. It is democratic because people get to participate in
the production of culture through mutual communication and mutual
Democratic culture invokes a participatory idea of
influence.
443 For Balkin, the traditional self-governance rationale,
democracy."
emphasizing participation in representative or democratic selfgovernment, "seems altogether too narrow in the age of the Internet." 444
The harmony between the self-emergence and democratic-culture
rationales is such that I agree with Balkin's description of the functional
importance of free expression:
438. One could possibly argue that the creation of social and cultural space for selfemergence also overlaps to a degree with the search-for-truth rationale. Yet, the concept of truth
in the digital age, as well as before, is so thorny that I do not believe it worthwhile to pursue this
argument. See FREDERICK F. SCHMITT, TRUTH: A PRIMER (1995) (presenting multiple views of

truth).
439. Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 438; Balkin, Digital, supranote 39, at 3.
440. Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 438; Balkin, Digital,supra note 39, at 3-4.
441. Numerous political theorists have argued that only a democratic culture, encouraging
negotiation and compromise, can sustain the interest-group conflicts of pluralist democracy.
E.g., DEMOCRACY, supra note 114, at 172; PREFACE, supra note 114, at 4, 143; DEWEY, supra note
111, at 162, 175.
442. Democratic culture "is a culture in which ordinary people can participate, both
collectively and individually, in the creation and elaboration of cultural meanings that constitute
them as individuals." Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 438.
443. Id.
444. Id.; see Balkin, Digital, supra note 39, at 34 (arguing that self-governance should
encompass culture and not merely representative government).
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Freedom of speech allows us, each of us, to participate in
the growth and development of the cultures and
subcultures that, in turn, help constitute us as individuals.
Freedom of speech is part of an interactive cycle of social
exchange, social participation, and self-formation. We
speak and we listen, we send out and we take in. As we do
this, we change, we grow, we become something other
than we were before, and we make something new out of
what existed before. 445
Nevertheless, the self-emergence rationale has two intertwined
advantages over Balkin's democratic-culture rationale. First, Balkin
insufficiently attends to the importance of individual autonomy.4 4 6 More
specifically, he ignores the feminist concept of relational autonomy.
Lacking this crucial concept, Balkin might have evaded a reliance on
autonomy precisely because critics of postmodernism maintain that a
socially constructed self necessarily ends in determinism. 447 In fact, Balkin
has suggested that we should understand life in the digital age from an
"antihumanist" perspective, 448 which treats "human beings as the
constructions and unwitting agents of larger forces." 449 But the concept of

445. Balkin, Digital, supra note 39, at 34.
446. To be sure, Balkin does not ignore autonomy, but he purposefully chooses to build his
philosophical rationale on the traditional self-governance rationale, which he argues
downplayed individual autonomy. Balkin, Future, supra note 39, at 439-40; Balkin, Digital,supra
note 39, at 28-29. Thus, when he articulates "free speech values," Balkin, Digital, supra note 39,
at 6, he specifies "interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform
culture." Id.
447. Taylor, supra note 295, at 2. Balkin himself is a postmodernist. Even so, in recent
years, Balkin has rarely invoked postmodernism explicitly, but he has written about the topic in
the past. J. M. Balkin, UnderstandingLegal Understanding:The Legal Subject and the Problem of
Legal Coherence, 103 YALE L.J. 105 (1993); Jack M. Balkin, What is a Postmodern
Constitutionalism?,90 MICH. L. REV. 1966 (1992). Balkin's democratic-culture rationale can be
fairly characterized as based on postmodern insights, although he does not use the term in the
text of either of his articles focused on the rationale. Balkin, Future,supra note 39; Balkin, Digital,
supra note 39; see Stephen M. Feldman, The Politicsof Postmodernjurisprudence,95 MICH. L. REV.
166, 185-201 (1996) (suggesting that Balkin is not a thoroughgoing postmodernist because of
how he conceives of deconstruction in relation to justice).
448. Jack M. Balkin, Information Power: The Information Society from an Antihumanist
Perspective, in THE GLOBAL FLOW OF INFORMATION 232, 233 (Ramesh Subramanian & Eddan Katz
eds., 2011).
449. Id. Balkin nonetheless writes: "The point of this analysis is not to deny the role that
human agency plays in making the world we inhabit." Id
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relational autonomy harmonizes human agency and autonomy with the
socially constructed (or relational) self.4 5 0 Feminist theory, in other words,
obviates any inclination to emphasize an antihumanist determinism. 451
This serious lacuna in Balkin's argument, his disregard for the concept
of relational autonomy, leads to the second advantage of the selfemergence rationale. By emphasizing an autonomous and emergent
individual, the self-emergence rationale resonates strongly with the
individualist ethos that has always permeated American culture. A
drawback to the democratic-culture rationale is precisely that it
emphasizes culture. An emphasis on culture is unlikely to engage many
Americans because, quite simply, it does not resonate with the
predominant American culture. But the self-emergence rationale is likely
to have widespread appeal. A focus on the autonomous emergent self
harmonizes with typical American concerns. Thus, while I agree with
Balkin that "speech involves cultural participation and self-formation," 452
a focus on self-formation rather than cultural participation will engender
a more effective rationale for the expansive protection of free
expression. 453
Consider the history of the search-for-truth rationale. As mentioned,
Milton articulated it in the seventeenth century, Mill reiterated it in the
nineteenth century, and Chafee restated it yet again mere months before
the Court decided Abrams. 45 4

When Holmes, in his Abrams dissent,

followed Chafee, he nonetheless added an important rhetorical twist.
Holmes seized upon the contemporary, if controversial, passion for the
economic marketplace to bolster his argument.45 5 Whereas Chafee
450. See RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 36.

451. Thus, on the one hand, my self-emergence rationale might be viewed as a humanist
response to Balkin's antihumanist approach. On the other hand, I do not believe that humanistantihumanist dichotomy is helpful. My views overlap considerably with Balkin's views, as I
explain in this Conclusion. Ultimately, my main criticism of Balkin, in this regard, is his
invocation of and emphasis on this dichotomy.
452. Balkin, Digital,supra note 39, at 34 (emphasis added).
453. It is possible that Balkin himself realized that a focus on culture would be a hard sell.
While I am conjecturing here, he might have decided for that reason to join his emphasis on
culture with an emphasis on democracy. A concern for democracy, after all, would resonate
more strongly with many Americans than would a concern for culture. Hence, a democraticculture rationale might be more appealing than a bald "culture" or "participatory culture"
rationale.
454. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA, supra note 73; MILl, supra note 73, at 21-27; Chafee, War Time,
supra note 65, at 933, 954.
455. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Chaffee,
War Time, supra note 65, at 960.
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invoked the value of "unlimited discussion," 45 6 Holmes suggested that
ideas (speech and writing) operate like products in an economic
marketplace. 457 Individuals should have the opportunity to choose,
unburdened by governmental restrictions-whether choosing products or
ideas. At a time in American history when laissez-faire ideology was
especially strong, the poetic Holmes seemingly recognized that a
marketplace metaphor would vividly symbolize to his contemporaries a
realm of individual liberty beyond government control. 458 Indeed, after
Holmes's Abrams dissent, many scholars and judges would refer to the
search-for-truth rationale as the marketplace-of-ideas rationale. 459
Once again, in the United States of the early-twenty-first century,
laissez-faire ideology (or neoliberalism) carries weight with many
Americans. 460 At such a time, an emphasis on the autonomous and
emergent individual self is likely to resonate far more strongly than an
emphasis on the production of culture. As Nedelsky underscores in her
book integrating feminist theory with American jurisprudence, the
concept of autonomy has an "iconic value" in American culture. 461 To be
sure, the rhetorical appeal of the self-emergence rationale is, in a sense,
ironic. After all, the rationale rejects the classical liberal self, perhaps the
prototypical manifestation of the American individualist ethos. Even so, in
our digital age, the self-emergence rationale might generate a nod of
recognition from many who would otherwise react to a democratic-culture
rationale with indifference.

456. Chafee, War Time, supranote 65, at 956.
457. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
458. See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF

OUR TIME (2001 ed.) (emphasizing strength of laissez-faire ideology in late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries).
459. E.g., Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 188-89 (2007).
460. See STEDMAN JONES, supra note 217.
461. NEDELSKY, supra note 38, at 42; see TURKLE, supra note 28, at 15 (arguing that everyday
life encourages us to view ourselves as autonomous intentional agents).

